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If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.

Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1 house.

  Builder : Shoemaker : : 1  pr.  shoes      : 1 house—wrong.
 ——-  ——-       100 pr. shoes	   : 1 house—right
 ——-  ——-       10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—wrong.

P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.

P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, i.e. numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.

P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], i.e. “we admit there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not only does but naturally may vary.”

P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act materially unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.

P. 121, l. 13. “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].

P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows:

“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the other does not.”

P. 122, l.18. As when a man is “justified at the Grass Market,” i.e. hung. P. 125, 1. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.

P. 128,1 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but one party.

P, 129, 1. 25. So in the Politics, 1. 2. Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev. Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy of Conscience.

P. 130, 1. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in a building.

P. 131, 1 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.

P. 131, 1. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language, he has a turn for Mathematics, i e something in his mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude.

P. 131, 1. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.” See the description of apetae II. 5.

P. 131, 1. 33. praxis is here used in its strict and proper meaning.

P. 131,1. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.

The question at issue always is, Is this Good? because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always Aye or No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later.

So far as what must take place in every Moral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good Moral Choice, i e.. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought.

The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

P. 132, l. 9. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.

P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to act ([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to make ([Greek: techne]).

Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)

P. 133, l. 20. The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, i.e. the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.

P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.