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But perhaps it may be said, that though no will or action can be immediately contradictory to reason, yet we may find such a contradiction in some of the attendants of the action, that is, in its causes or effects. The action may cause a judgment, or may be obliquely caused by one, when the judgment concurs with a passion; and by an abusive way of speaking, which philosophy will scarce allow of, the same contrariety may, upon that account, be ascribed to the action. How far this truth or faishood may be the source of morals, it will now be proper to consider.
It has been observed, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. These are the only kinds of judgment, which can accompany our actions, or can be said to produce them in any manner; and it must be allowed, that these judgments may often be false and erroneous. A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces the contrary to what is imagined. A person may also take false measures for the attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct, instead of forwarding the execution of any project. These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a figurative and improper way of speaking. But though this be acknowledged, it is easy to observe, that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality, that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fail into them. They extend not beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have not generally supposed criminal, as being perfectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. A fruit, for instance, that is really disagreeable, appears to me at a distance, and through mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious. Here is one error. I choose certain means of reaching this fruit, which are not proper for my end. Here is a second error; nor is there any third one, which can ever possibly enter into our reasonings concerning actions. I ask, therefore, if a man, in this situation, and guilty of these two errors, is to be regarded as vicious and criminal, however unavoidable they might have been? Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality?
And here it may be proper to observe, that if moral distinctions be derived from the truth or falshood of those judgments, they must take place wherever we form the judgments; nor will there be any difference, whether the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom, or whether the error be avoidable or unavoidable. For as the very essence of morality is supposed to consist in an agreement or disagreement to reason, the other circumstances are entirely arbitrary, and can never either bestow on any action the character of virtuous or vicious, or deprive it of that character. To which we may add, that this agreement or disagreement, not admitting of degrees, all virtues and vices would of course be equal.
Should it be pretended, that though a mistake of fact be not criminal, yet a mistake of right often is; and that this may be the source of immorality: I would answer, that it is impossible such a mistake can ever be the original source of immorality, since it supposes a real right and wrong; that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of these judgments. A mistake, therefore, of right may become a species of immorality; but it is only a secondary one, and is founded on some other, antecedent to it.
As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions, and which, when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason; we may observe, that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in ourselves, and that it is only on others they have such an influence. It is certain, that an action, on many occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a person, who through a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood; only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another, but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. It causes, however, a mistake and false judgment by accident; and the falshood of its effects may be ascribed, by some odd figurative way of speaking, to the action itself. But still I can see no pretext of reason for asserting, that the tendency to cause such an error is the first spring or original source of all immorality.
[FN 12. One might think it were entirely superfluous
to prove this, if a late author [William Wollaston, THE
RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED (London 1722)], who has had
the good fortune to obtain some reputation, had not
seriously affirmed, that such a falshood is the foundation
of all guilt and moral deformity. That we may discover the
fallacy of his hypothesis, we need only consider, that a
false conclusion is drawn from an action, only by means of
an obscurity of natural principles, which makes a cause be
secretly interrupted In its operation, by contrary causes,
and renders the connexion betwixt two objects uncertain and
variable. Now, as a like uncertainty and variety of causes
take place, even in natural objects, and produce a like
error in our judgment, if that tendency to produce error
were the very essence of vice and immorality, it should
follow, that even inanimate objects might be vicious and
immoral.
One might think It were entirely superfluous to prove this,
if a late author [William Wollaston, THE RELIGION OF NATURE
DELINEATED (London 1722)], who has had the good fortune to
obtain some reputation, had not seriously affirmed, that
such a falshood is the foundation of all guilt and moral
deformity. That we may discover the fallacy of his
hypothesis, we need only consider, that a false conclusion
is drawn from an action, only by means of an obscurity of
natural principles, which makes a cause be secretly
interrupted In its operation, by contrary causes, and
renders the connexion betwixt two objects uncertain and
variable. Now, as a like uncertainty and variety of causes
take place, even in natural objects, and produce a like
error in our judgment, if that tendency to produce error
were the very essence of vice and immorality, it should
follow, that even inanimate objects might be vicious and
immoral.
It is in vain to urge, that inanimate objects act without
liberty and choice. For as liberty and choice are not
necessary to make an action produce in us an erroneous
conclusion, they can be, in no respect, essential to
morality; and I do not readily perceive, upon this system,
how they can ever come to be regarded by it. If the tendency
to cause error be the origin of immorality, that tendency
and immorality would in every case be inseparable.
Add to this, that if I had used the precaution of shutting
the windows, while I indulged myself in those liberties with
my neighbour's wife, I should have been guilty of no
immorality; and that because my action, being perfectly
concealed, would have had no tendency to produce any false
conclusion.
For the same reason, a thief, who steals In by a ladder at a
window, and takes all imaginable care to cause no
disturbance, is in no respect criminal. For either he will
not be perceived, or if he be, it is impossible he can
produce any error, nor will any one, from these
circumstances, take him to be other than what he really is.
It is well known, that those who are squint-sighted, do very
readily cause mistakes in others, and that we Imagine they
salute or are talking to one person, while they address
themselves to anther. Are they therefore, upon that account,
immoral?
Besides, we may easily observe, that in all those arguments
there is an evident reasoning in a circle. A person who
takes possession of another's goods, and uses them as his
own, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this
falshood is the source of the immorality of injustice. But
is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without
an antecedent morality?
A man that is ungrateful to his benefactor, in a manner
affirms, that he never received any favours from him. But in
what manner? Is it because it is his duty to be grateful?
But this supposes, that there is some antecedent rule of
duty and morals. Is it because human nature is generally
grateful, and makes us conclude, that a man who does any
harm never received any favour from the person he harmed?
But human nature is not so generally grateful, as to justify
such a conclusion. Or if it were, is an exception to a
general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason
than because it is an exception?
But what may suffice entirely to destroy this whimsical
system is, that it leaves us under the same difficulty to
give a reason why truth is virtuous and falshood vicious, as
to account for the merit or turpitude of any other action. I
shall allow, if you please, that all immorality is derived
from this supposed falshood in action, provided you can give
me any plausible reason, why such a falshood is immoral. If
you consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself
in the same difficulty as at the beginning.
This last argument is very conclusive; because, if there be
not an evident merit or turpitude annexed to this species of
truth or falahood, It can never have any influence upon our
actions. For, who ever thought of forbearing any action,
because others might possibly draw false conclusions from
it? Or, who ever performed any, that he might give rise to
true conclusions?]
