Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.'

The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1. Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo genere.

This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth century, in the 'Pensées':—

'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est infiniment incompréhensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il n'a nul rapport à nous; nous sommes done incapables de connâitre ni ce qn'il est, ni s'il est.'—(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p. lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)

The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at Athens, as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia, ran thus—'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces other novelties in regard to the Gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth.'

These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not merely by the Athenian people, but generally by other societies also. They all agree in antipathy to free, individual, dissenting reason; though that antipathy manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh in another. The Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity, becomes at the same time an outcast ([Greek: aphrhêtôr, athhemistos, anhestios]) among those whose Gods he has deserted. As a general fact, the man who dissents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion, purchases an undisturbed life only by being content with that 'semi-liberty under silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was thankful under the dictatorship of Julius Cæsar. 'Obsecro—abiiciamus ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; quod assequemur et tacendo et latendo' (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable declaration of Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and abstinence from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life would not be worth having under such conditions.

Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006—

pros tauta, rhipthesthô men aithaloussa phlox,
leykoptherps de niphadi kai bronthêmasin
chthonhiois kykhatô phanta kahi tarasshetô
gnhampsei gar ouden tôndhe m'——
eiselthetô se mhêpot, hôs egô, Dios
gnhômên phobêtheis, thêlhynoys genhêsomai,
kai liparhêsô ton mhega stygohymenon
gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherhôn,
lyshai me dhesmôn tônde toy pantos oheô.

Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled Prometheus, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the finest poetry.

Euripid Hippol., 10—

(Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos
monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias
legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai
Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,—
tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos—

(Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' hegô Chairein lhego—
(112.)

See also v. 1328—1402.

Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri; also iii. 40

See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant, after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded, supplicating Aphroditê to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)

See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight, pp. 222, 241—247, in the second edition of this work.

Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiæ,' i 51—'Et quidem substantia quæ nullâ planè re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi—nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursûs Dei existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo et illis univocè, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus nominis significatio potest distinctè intelligi, quæ Deo et creaturis sit communis.'

At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the following affirmation (p. 201):—

'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the Law of Causation, and which makes us unable to conceive the beginning of anything without an antecedent condition, or cause.' Such 'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts. First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement is obtained what the word cause means. If three persons, A, B, and C, agree in affirming it—A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill—the agreement is purely verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.

Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any greater difficulty. These latter believe that there are, throughout, constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event depends; but they can perfectly conceive events as occurring without any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as pervading all nature, is an acquired result of scientific training. The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular, others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that all volitions occur without any cause at all.