The Critique of Practical Reason
THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
By Immanuel Kant
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason.
FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL
BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical
CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical
II. THEOREM I.
III. THEOREM II.
IV. THEOREM II.
V. PROBLEM I.
VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL
VIII. THEOREM IV.
Practical Material Principles of Determination
taken as the Foundation of Morality, are:
I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental
Principles of Pure
II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its
Practical use has to an Extension which is not possible to it in its
CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to
the Notions of Good
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement.
CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical
Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure
BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical
CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in
defining the Conception of the "Summum Bonum".
I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.
II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of
III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in
its Union with the Speculative Reason.
IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate
of Pure Practical Reason.
V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure
VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension
of Pure Reason in a Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as
Speculative being enlarged at the same time?
VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure
IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive
Faculties to his Practical Destination.
SECOND PART. -- METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason.
This work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the pure
practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative critique
would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this appears
sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that there
is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire
practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it has no need to
criticize the pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason in making
such a claim does not presumptuously overstep itself (as is the case with
the speculative reason). For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical,
it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all
disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile.
With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established; freedom,
namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in
its use of the concept of causality in order to escape the antinomy into
which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries
to think the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit this
concept (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought, without
assuring it any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed
impossibility of what it must at least allow to be thinkable should
endanger its very being and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism.
Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an
apodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole system
of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts (those of God
and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now
attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistence and
objective reality; that is to say, their possibility is proved by the fact
that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law.