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The doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it as a religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of the summum bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy (unyielding) and demands holiness of morals, although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is still only virtue, that is, a rightful disposition arising from respect for the law, implying consciousness of a constant propensity to transgression, or at least a want of purity, that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral) motives of obedience to the law, consequently a self-esteem combined with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a progress in infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping for an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and all powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of rational beings to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not promise any happiness, for according to our conceptions of an order of nature in general, this is not necessarily connected with obedience to the law. Now Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second indispensable element of the summum bonum) by representing the world in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to each of itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived summum bonum possible. Holiness of life is prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while the welfare proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as attainable only in an eternity; because the former must always be the pattern of their conduct in every state, and progress towards it is already possible and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the name of happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope. Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is not theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences.
* It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality
has no advantage in respect of purity over the moral
conceptions of the Stoics; the distinction between them is,
however, very obvious. The Stoic system made the
consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on which all
moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples
spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they
placed the spring and proper determining principle of the
will in an elevation of the mind above the lower springs of
the senses, which owe their power only to weakness of mind.
With them therefore, virtue was a sort of heroism in the
wise man raising himself above the animal nature of man, is
sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties to
others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to
any temptation to transgress the moral law. All this,
however, they could not have done if they had conceived this
law in all its purity and strictness, as the precept of the
Gospel does. When I give the name idea to a perfection to
which nothing adequate can be given in experience, it does
not follow that the moral ideas are thing transcendent, that
is something of which we could not even determine the
concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether
there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the
case with the ideas of speculative reason; on the contrary,
being types of practical perfection, they serve as the
indispensable rule of conduct and likewise as the standard
of comparison. Now if I consider Christian morals on their
philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of the
Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of
the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians
are: simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness.
In respect of the way of attaining them, the Greek schools
were distinguished from one another thus that the Cynics
only required common sense, the others the path of science,
but both found the mere use of natural powers sufficient for
the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is
framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding,
takes from man all confidence that he can be fully adequate
to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by
enabling us to hope that if we act as well as it is in our
power to do, then what is not in our power will come in to
our aid from another source, whether we know how this may be
or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin
of our moral conceptions.
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In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign and contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. Here again, then, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world; and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in which the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is the determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the summum bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by strict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness.
Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not unworthy of it.
A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs to one's state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it follows from this that morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happiness, that is, an instruction how to become happy; for it has to do simply with the rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness, not with the means of attaining it. But when morality has been completely expounded (which merely imposes duties instead of providing rules for selfish desires), then first, after the moral desire to promote the summum bonum (to bring the kingdom of God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on a law, and which could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when for the behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then this ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because the hope of happiness first begins with religion only.
