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SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?
ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true.
SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?
ALCIBIADES: He does not.
SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?
ALCIBIADES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?
ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference.
SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain.
SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best.
ALCIBIADES: I will.
SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.
ALCIBIADES: What caution?
SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way.
ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.
SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?
ALCIBIADES: Very good.
SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.
SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?
ALCIBIADES: That is quite true.
SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?
ALCIBIADES: That is evident.
SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?
