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XV. Is Prayer Meritorious?
S. Augustine, On Psalm xxvi.
Ep. cxxx. ad Probam.
XVI. Do Sinners gain Anything from God by their Prayers?
XVII. Can We rightly term "Supplications," "Prayers,"
"Intercessions," and "Thanksgivings," parts of Prayer?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Prayer of the Consecration
S. Augustine, Of Divers Questions, iv.
[Pg 68]
S. Isidore says[98]: "To pray is the same thing as to speak." Speaking, however, belongs to the intellect. Hence prayer is not an act of the appetitive, but of the intellectual faculties.
According to Cassiodorus, on those words of the Psalmist: Hear my prayer, O Lord, and my supplication, give ear to my tears,[99] prayer means "the lips' reasoning." Now there is this difference between the speculative and the practical reason, that the speculative reason merely apprehends things, while the practical reason not only apprehends things, but actually causes them. But one thing is the cause of another in two ways: in one way, perfectly—namely, as inducing a necessity—as happens when the effect comes entirely under the power of a cause; in another way, imperfectly—namely, by merely disposing to it—as happens when an effect is not entirely under the power of a cause.
And so, too, reason is in two ways the cause of certain things: in one way as imposing a necessity; and in this way it belongs to the reason to command not merely the lower faculties and the bodily members, but even men who are subject to us, and this is done by giving commands. In another way as inducing, and in some sort disposing to, an effect; and in this way the reason asks for something to be done by those who are subject to it, whether they be equals or superiors.[Pg 69]
But both of these—namely, to command something, or to ask or beg for something to be done—imply a certain arrangement—as when a man arranges for something to be done by somebody else. And in this respect both of these acts come under the reason whose office it is to arrange. Hence the Philosopher says[100]: "Reason asks for the best things."
Here, then, we speak of prayer as implying a certain asking or petition, for, as S. Augustine says[101]: "Prayer is a certain kind of petition"; so, too, S. John Damascene says[102]: "Prayer is the asking of fitting things from God."
Hence it is clear that the prayer of which we are here speaking is an act of the reason.
Some, however, think that prayer is an act of the appetitive powers, thus:
1. The whole object of prayer is to be heard, and the Psalmist says that it is our desires which are heard: The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.[103] Prayer, then, is desire; but desire is an act of the appetitive powers.
But the Lord is said to hear the desires of the poor either because their desire is the reason why they ask—since our petitions are in a certain sense the outward expression of our desires; or this may be said in order to show the swiftness with which He hears them—even while things are only existing in the poor man's desire; God hears them even before they are expressed in prayer. And this accords with the words of Isaias: And it shall come to pass that before they shall call I will hear, as they are yet speaking I will hear.[104]
2. Again, Denis the Areopagite says: "But before all things it is good to begin with prayer, as thereby giving ourselves up to and uniting ourselves with God."[105] But union with God comes through love, and love belongs to the appetitive powers; therefore prayer, too, would seem to belong to the appetitive powers.
But the will moves the reason to its end or object. Hence there is nothing to prevent the reason, under the direction of the will, from tending to the goal of charity, which is union with God. Prayer, however, tends towards God—moved, that is, by the will, which itself is motived by charity—in two ways: in one way by reason of that which is asked for, since in prayer we have particularly to ask that we may be united with God, according to those words: One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life.[106] And in another way prayer tends towards God—by reason, namely, of the petitioner himself; for such a one must approach him from whom he asks something, and this either bodily, as when he draws nigh to a man, or mentally, as when he draws nigh to God.
Hence the same Denis says: "When we invoke God in prayer we are before Him with our minds laid bare." In the same sense S. John Damascene says: "Prayer is the ascent of the mind towards God."
Cajetan: Prayer demands of the petitioner a twofold union with God: the one is general—the union, that is, of friendship—and is produced by charity, so that further on[107] we shall find the friendship arising from charity enumerated among the conditions for infallibly efficacious prayer. The second kind of union may be termed substantial union; it is the effect of prayer itself. It is that union of application by which the mind offers itself and all it has to God in service—viz., by devout affections, by meditations, and by external acts. By such union as this a man who prays is inseparable from God in his worship and service, just as when one man serves another he is inseparable from him in his service (on 2. 2. 83. 1).
"And now, O Lord, Thou art our Father, and we are clay: and Thou art our Maker, and we are all the works of Thy hands. Be not very angry, O Lord, and remember no longer our iniquity: behold, see we are all Thy people."[108]
In S. Luke's Gospel we read: We ought always to pray and not to faint.[109]
A threefold error regarding prayer existed amongst the ancients; for some maintained that[Pg 72] human affairs were not directed by Divine Providence; whence it followed that it was altogether vain to pray or to worship God; of such we read: You have said, he laboureth in vain that serveth God.[110] A second opinion was that all things, even human affairs, happened of necessity—whether from the immutability of Divine Providence, or from a necessity imposed by the stars, or from the connection of causes; and this opinion, of course, excluded all utility from prayer. A third opinion was that human affairs were indeed directed by Divine Providence, and that human affairs did not happen of necessity, but that Divine Providence was changeable, and that consequently its dispositions were changed by our prayers and by other acts of religious worship. These views, however, have elsewhere been shown to be wrong.
