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3. S. Gregory says[321]: "It belongs to the contemplative life to rest from all exterior action." But the affective or appetitive powers tend towards external action. Hence it would seem that the contemplative life does not come under them.
But the appetitive powers not only move the bodily members to the performance of external acts, but the intellect, too, is moved by them to the exercise of contemplation.
"Hear, you that are far off, what I have done, and you that are near, know My strength. The sinners in Sion are afraid, trembling hath seized upon the hypocrites. Which of you can dwell with devouring fire? which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? He that walketh in justices, and speaketh truth, that casteth away avarice by oppression, and shaketh his hands from all bribes, that stoppeth his ears lest he hear blood, and shutteth his eyes that he may see no evil. He shall dwell on high, the fortifications of rocks shall be his highness: bread is given him, his waters are sure. His eyes shall see the King in His beauty, they shall see the land far off."[322]
S. Thomas: We do not enjoy all the things that we have; and this is either because they do not afford us delight, or because they are not the ultimate goal of our desires, and so are incapable of satisfying our yearnings or affording us repose. But these three things the Blessed have in God: for they see Him, and seeing Him they hold Him ever present to them, for they have it in their power always to see Him; and holding Him, they[Pg 182] enjoy Him, satisfying their yearnings with That Which is The Ultimate End (Summa Theologica, I., xii. 7, ad 3m).
"As the hart panteth after the fountains of water: so my soul panteth after Thee, O God. My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God; when shall I come and appear before the face of God? My tears have been my bread day and night, whilst it is said to me daily: Where is thy God? These things I remembered, and poured out my soul in me; for I shall go over into the place of the wonderful tabernacle, even to the house of God. With the voice of joy and praise; the noise of one feasting. Why art thou sad, O my soul? and why dost thou trouble me? Hope in God, for I will still give praise to Him: the salvation of my countenance, and my God."[323]
The moral virtues are directed towards external actions, and S. Gregory says[324]: "It belongs to the contemplative life to abstain from all external action." Hence the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life.
A thing may pertain to the contemplative life either essentially or by way of disposition towards it. Essentially, then, the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life; for the goal of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth. "Knowledge," says the Philosopher, "which pertains to the consideration of truth, has little to do[Pg 183] with the moral virtues."[325] Hence he also says[326] that moral virtues pertain to active, not to contemplative happiness.
But dispositively the moral virtues do belong to the contemplative life. For actual contemplation, in which the contemplative life essentially consists, is impeded both by the vehemence of the passions which distract the soul from occupation with the things of the intellect, and divert it to the things of sense, and also by external disturbances. The moral virtues, however, keep down the vehemence of the passions, and check the disturbance that might arise from external occupations.
Consequently the moral virtues do pertain to the contemplative life, but by way of disposition thereto.
But some maintain that the moral virtues do pertain to the contemplative life, thus:
1. S. Gregory says[327]: "The contemplative life means keeping charity towards God and our neighbour with our whole soul." But all the moral virtues—acts of which fall under precept—are reduced to love of God and of our neighbour; for Love is the fulfilling of the Law.[328] Consequently it would seem that the moral virtues do pertain to the contemplative life.
But, as we have already said, the contemplative life is motived by the affective faculties, and consequently love of God and of our neighbour are required for the contemplative life. Impelling causes, however, do not enter[Pg 184] into the essence of a thing, but prepare for it and perfect it. Hence it does not follow that the moral virtues essentially pertain to the contemplative life.
2. Again; the contemplative life is especially directed towards the contemplation of God, as S. Gregory says: "The soul, trampling all cares underfoot, ardently yearns to see its Creator's face." But no one can attain to this without that cleanness of heart which the moral virtues procure: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God,[329] and again: Follow peace with all men with holiness, without which no man shall see God.[330]
But holiness—that is, cleanness of heart—is produced by those virtues which have to do with those passions which hinder the purity of the reason. And peace is produced by justice—the moral virtue which is concerned with our works: The work of justice shall be peace[331] inasmuch, that is, as a man, by refraining from injuring others, removes occasions of strife and disturbance.
3. Lastly, S. Gregory says[332]: "The contemplative life is something beautiful in the soul," and it is for this reason that it is said to be typified by Rachel, for She was well-favoured and of a beautiful countenance.[333] But the beauty of the soul, as S. Ambrose remarks, depends upon the moral virtues and especially on that of temperance.[334]
But beauty consists in a certain splendour combined with a becoming harmony. Both of these points are radically to be referred to the reason, for to it belongs both the light which manifests beauty, and the establishment of due proportion in others. Consequently in the contemplative life—which consists in the act of the reason—beauty is necessarily and essentially to be found; thus of the contemplation of Wisdom it is said: And I became a lover of her beauty.[335] But in the moral virtues beauty is only found by a certain participation—in proportion, namely, as they share in the harmony of reason; and this is especially the case with the virtue of temperance whose function it is to repress those desires which particularly obscure the light of reason. Hence it is, too, that the virtue of chastity especially renders a man fit for contemplation, for venereal pleasures are precisely those which, as S. Augustine points out, most drag down the mind to the things of sense.[336]
