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All, however, do not agree with this division, thus:
1. Contemplation means a state of repose, as is said in Wisdom[381]: When I go into my house I shall repose myself with Her. And motion is opposed to repose. Consequently the operations of the contemplative life cannot be designated according to these different species of motion.
But whereas external bodily movements are opposed to that repose of contemplation which is understood to be rest from external occupations, the motion of intellectual operations belongs precisely to the repose of contemplation.
2. Again, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect wherein man is at one with the Angels. But S. Denis does not apply these motions to the Angels in the same way as he does to the soul; for he says that the circular motion of the Angels "corresponds to the illumination of the beautiful and the good." But of the circular motion of the soul he gives several definitions, of which the first is "the return of the soul upon itself as opposed to external things"; the second is "a certain wrapping together of the powers of the soul whereby it is freed from error and from external occupation"; and the third is "the union of the soul with things superior to it." Similarly, he speaks in different terms of the direct motion of the soul as compared with that of the Angels. For he says that the direct motion of an Angel is "according as he proceeds to the care of the things subject to him"; while the direct motion of the soul is made to consist in two things: first of all "that it proceeds to those things which are around it"; secondly, that "from external things it is uplifted to simple contemplation." And lastly, he explains the oblique motion differently in each case. For he makes the oblique motion of the Angels consist in this that, "while providing for[Pg 206] those that have less than themselves, they remain in the same attitude towards God"; but the oblique motion of the soul he explains as meaning that "the soul is illumined by Divine knowledge rationally and diffusely."
Consequently it does not appear that the operations of contemplation are fittingly distinguished according to the aforesaid species of motion.
But while man's intellect is generally the same with that of the Angels, the intellectual powers of the latter are far higher than in man. It was therefore necessary to assign the aforesaid motions to human souls and to the Angels in different fashion in proportion as their intellectual powers are not uniform. For the Angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects: firstly, because the Angels do not acquire intelligible truth from the variety of compound things; and secondly, because they do not understand intelligible truth discursively, but by simple intuition. Whereas the intellect of the human soul, on the contrary, acquires intelligible truth from the things of sense, and understands it by the discursive action of the reason.
Hence S. Denis assigns to the Angels circular motion in that they uniformly and unceasingly, without beginning or end, gaze upon God; just as circular motion, which has neither beginning nor end, is uniformly maintained round the same central point. But in the case of the human soul, its twofold lack of[Pg 207] uniformity must be removed before it can attain to the above-mentioned uniformity. For there must first be removed that lack of uniformity which arises from the diversity of external things: that is, the soul must quit external things. And this S. Denis expresses first of all in his definition of the circular motion of the soul when he speaks of "the return of the soul upon itself as opposed to external things." And there must be removed in the second place that second lack of uniformity which arises from the discursive action of the reason. And this takes place when all the operations of the soul are reduced to the simple contemplation of intelligible truth. This forms the second part of S. Denis's definition of this circular motion—namely, when he speaks of the necessity of "a certain wrapping together of the powers of the soul," with the result that, when discursive action thus ceases, the soul's gaze is fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. And in this operation of the soul there is no room for error, just as there is no room for error in our understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.
Then, when these first two steps have been taken, S. Denis puts in the third place that uniformity, like to that of the Angels, by which the soul, laying aside all else, persists in the simple contemplation of God. And this he expresses when he says: "Then, as now made uniform, it, as a whole"—that is, as conformed (to[Pg 208] God)—"is, with all its powers unified, led by the hand to the Beautiful and the Good."
But the direct motion in the Angels cannot be understood in the sense that, by considering, they proceed from one point to another; but solely according to the order of their providential care for others—according, namely, as the superior Angels illumine the inferior through those who stand between. And this is what S. Denis means when he says that the direct motion of an Angel is "according as he proceeds to the care of the things subject to him, taking in his course all things that are direct" following—that is, those things which are disposed in direct order. But to the human soul S. Denis assigns direct motion in the sense that it proceeds from the exterior things of sense to the knowledge of intelligible things.
And he assigns oblique motion to the Angels—a motion, that is, compounded of the direct and the circular—inasmuch as an Angel, according to his contemplation of God, provides for those inferior to him. To the human soul, on the contrary, he assigns this same oblique motion, similarly compounded of the direct and the circular motions, inasmuch as in its reasonings it makes use of the Divine illuminations.
3. Lastly, Richard of S. Victor[382] gives many other and different kinds of motion. For, following[Pg 209] the analogy of the birds of the air, he says of these latter that "some at one time ascend on high, at another swoop down to earth, and they do this again and again; others turn now to the right, now to the left, and this repeatedly; others go in advance, others fall behind; some sail round and round in circles, now narrower and now wider; while others again remain almost immovably suspended in one place." From all which it would seem that there are not merely three movements in contemplation.
But all these diversities of motion which are expressed by, up and down, to right and left, backwards and forwards, and in varying circles, are reducible either to direct or to oblique motion, for they all signify the discursive action of the reason. For if this discursive action be from the genus to the species or from the whole to the part, it will be, as Richard of S. Victor himself explains, motion upwards and downwards. If, again, it means argumentation from one thing to its opposite, it will come under motion to right and left. Or if it be deduction from cause to effect, then it will be motion backwards and forwards. And finally, if it mean arguing from the accidents which surround a thing, whether nearly or remotely, it will be circuitous motion. But the discursive action of the reason arguing from the things of sense to intelligible things according to the orderly progress of the natural reason, belongs to[Pg 210] direct motion. When, however, it arises from Divine illuminations, it comes under oblique motion, as we have already said (in the reply to the second argument). Lastly, only the immobility which he mentions will come under circular motion.
Whence it appears that S. Denis has quite sufficiently, and with exceeding subtlety, described the movements of contemplation.
"For behold my witness is in Heaven, and He that knoweth my conscience is on high. For behold short years pass away, and I am walking in a path by which I shall not return."[383]
