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Because of the Persian origin of Zoroaster one might[Pg 137] imagine that influences of Persian philosophy would be discoverable in the teachings of this nomadic poet. But with the name all similarity between the spokesman and his doctrines ends. Nietzsche's choice of Zoroaster as his mouthpiece grew out of his early admiration for the Persians who, he declared, "were the first to take a broad and comprehensive view of history." As we see Zoroaster in this book we recognise him at once as none other than Nietzsche himself; and the experiences through which he goes in his wanderings are but picturesquely stated accounts of Nietzsche's own sufferings, raptures, aspirations and disappointments. To those familiar with Nietzsche's life, many of the characters introduced in the book will be recognised as portraitures of men whose lives crossed that of the philosopher. Likewise, many of the parables and fables are thinly disguised accounts of the incidents in his own life. In the last part of the book we find Nietzsche creating a fantastic poet to represent Wagner, and holding him up to severe and uncompromising criticism.

Zoroaster, as he appears in this book, is an itinerant law-giver and prophet who seeks the waste places of the earth, the mountains, plains and sea shores, avoiding mankind and carrying with him two symbolic animals, an eagle and a snake. At the end of his wanderings he discovers a lion which is for him the sign that his journey is drawing to a close, for this lion represents all that is best and most powerful in nature. The book is comprised of the discourses and sermons which Zoroaster delivers from day to day to the occasional disciples and unbelievers who cross the path of his wanderings. There are conversations between him and his accompanying animals; and in the last part of the book he gathers together[Pg 138] in his cave a number of men representing types of the higher man and talks with them. In all his discourses he makes use of a rhapsodic and poetic style, not unlike that found in the Psalms of David. The text telling of Zoroaster's wanderings and experiences is cast in the manner of the early religious books of the Orientals.

"Thus Spake Zarathustra" was the first book to follow "Human, All-Too-Human," "The Dawn of Day" and "The Joyful Wisdom," and many of Nietzsche's constructive ideas are presented here for the first time. Part I is more lucid and can be more easily understood than the parts which follow. In it Nietzsche designates the classes of humanity and differentiates between them. His three famous metamorphoses of the spirit—symbolised by the camel, the lion and the child—are stated and explained. Here we find the philosopher's most widely quoted passages pertaining to marriage and child-bearing; his doctrine of war and peace; and those passages wherein he reverses the beatitudes. The passions and preferences of the individual are criticised in their relation to the higher man, and the more obvious instincts are analysed. Nietzsche outlines methods of conduct, and dissects the actions and attitudes of his disciples, praising them or blaming them in accordance with his own values. He presents an illuminating analysis of charity, and outlines in his chapter, "The Bestowing Virtue," the conditions under which it may become a means to existence. He poses the problem of relative morality, and suggests the lines along which his thesis will be developed at a later date. The superman is defined briefly but with a completeness sufficient for us to sense his relation to the philosophical scheme of which he is a part. The conception of the superman was founded on[Pg 139] Darwin's doctrine of organic evolution, and Nietzsche seeks to bring this superman about by the application of the law of natural selection and by giving the law of the survival of the fittest an open field for operation. Here, too, we have the statement of Nietzsche's racial ideal: the highest exemplars of the race, and not a standardized goal, is the aim of his philosophy.

In Part II the doctrine of the will to power is clearly set forth in its framework. The chapter wherein this appears—"Self-Surpassing"—is merely a brief exposition founded on observation. The development of this idea is not to be found until toward the end of Nietzsche's life; but that the theory was clearly conceived in his mind is evidenced by the fact that it is constantly being applied throughout the remainder of his works. In its present form it is no more than a statement, but so clearly is it presented that one is able to grasp its significance and to determine in just what manner it differed from the Darwinian and Spencerian doctrines. In this same section are contained many personal chapters, including an excoriation of his early critics, a comparison between himself and Schopenhauer, an account of his early anti-scholastic warfare, a criticism of modern scientific methods, a reference to his friendship with Wagner, and an expression of regret at the misunderstanding which greeted his earlier works. One of the final chapters offers a definition of "profundity" which goes deep into the very undercurrents of his philosophy.

The most important material to be found in the book is encountered in Part III. Under the caption, "The Old and the New Tables," we have an important summing up of the principal teachings in the Nietzschean philosophical scheme. Here also we meet the doctrine[Pg 140] of eternal recurrence which, as I have said, generated the conception of this book. Its present statement is limited to a few tentative speculations; later on it was developed and set forth with greater force and certainty. But despite the fact that in his autobiography Nietzsche calls this speculative philosophic doctrine "the highest of all possible formul of a Yea-saying philosophy," too much importance must not be attached to it in its relation to his writings. In the first place it was by no means new with him: he himself reconnoitred a bit in one of his early essays looking for its possible origin. And in the second place it had little influence on his main doctrine of the superman. Although he spent considerable time and space in its elucidation, it never became an integral part of any of his teachings. Rather was it something superimposed on his other formul—a condition introduced into the actualities of his conception of the universe. I am inclined to think that he flirted with this idea of recurrence largely because it was the most disheartening obstacle he could conceive in the path of the superman; and as no obstacle was too great to be faced triumphantly by this man of the future, he imposed this condition of eternal recurrence upon him as an ultimate test of fortitude. This idea would have added the final touch of futility to ambition, and Nietzsche could not conceive of true greatness in man unless futility was at the bottom of all ambitions. However, it is possible to eliminate the entire idea of eternal recurrence from Nietzsche's work without altering fundamentally any of his main teachings, for it is, in his very conception of it, a deputy condition of existence.

Part IV, the narrative section, answers the query often raised: For whom is Nietzsche's philosophy intended?[Pg 141] It does away once and for all with the assumption of certain critics that his writings were for all classes. In fact, this assumption, constantly posited by scholars—even those who claim to possess an intimate knowledge of Nietzsche's work—is nowhere borne out in his text. As far back as "Thoughts out of Season" the reverse of this supposition was inferentially stated; and in "The Antichrist" and "The Will to Power" we have definite denials that his doctrines were intended for every one. Yet one is constantly encountering critical refutations of his philosophy based on the theory that he addressed his teachings to all men. Nothing could be further from the truth. He held no vision of a race of supermen: a millennium founded on the exertion of power was neither his aim nor his hope. His philosophy was entirely aristocratic. It was a system of ethics designed for the masters of the race; and his books were gifts for the intelligent man alone. Locke, Rousseau and Hume are often brought forward by critics as answers to his attempts at transvaluation; but a close inspection of Nietzsche's definition of slave-morality, which was an important factor in his ethical scheme, will show that it is possible to accept the philosophy of the superman without abrogating the softer ethics of these three other thinkers. Nietzsche's stand in regard to his audience is made obvious in the fable of Zarathustra. The poet-philosopher experiences the instinct for pity, but on going out into the world, he recognises this instinct as pertaining only to the "higher men." When he finds numerous of these men in danger from the ignorance of the populace and from the restrictions of environment, he leads them to his cave, and there, isolated from the inferior man, discourses with them on the problems of life and points out to them the[Pg 142] course they must take in order to bring about the superman.