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All the company fell a-laughing at this pleasant preface, and from that time Euthydemus never avoided Socrates’ company as he had done before; but he never offered to speak, believing that his silence would be an argument of his modesty.  Socrates, being desirous to rally him out of that mistaken notion, spoke to him in this manner:—

“I wonder that they who desire to learn to play upon the lute, or to ride well, do not endeavour to learn it alone by themselves; but that they look out for masters, resolved to do everything they bid them, and to believe all they say, there being no other way to arrive at perfection in those arts; and that they who hope one day to govern the Republic, and to declaim before the people, imagine they can become fit to do so of themselves all of a sudden.  Nevertheless, it must be owned that these employments are more difficult than the others, since among the great number of persons who push themselves into office so few discharge their duty as they ought.  This shows us that more labour and diligence is required in such as would capacitate themselves for those offices than for anything else.”

By these discourses, Socrates having prepared the mind of Euthydemus to hearken to what he intended to say to him, and to enter into conference with him, he came another time by himself into the same shop, p. 151and taking a seat next to this young man—“I have heard,” said he to him, “that you have been curious in buying a great many good books.”  “I have,” said Euthydemus, “and continue to do so every day, designing to have as many as I can get.”  “I commend you very much,” said Socrates, “for choosing rather to hoard up a treasure of learning and knowledge than of money.  For you testify by so doing that you are not of opinion that riches, or silver and gold, can render one more valuable, that is to say, a wiser or a better man; but that it is only the writings and precepts of the philosophers and other fine writers that are the true riches, because they enrich with virtue the minds of those that possess them.”  Euthydemus was pleased to hear him say this, believing that he approved his method; and Socrates, perceiving his satisfaction, went on: “But what is your design of making a collection of so many books?  Do you intend to be a physician?  There are many books in that science.”  “That is not my design,” said Euthydemus.  “Will you be an architect, then?” said Socrates, “for that art requires a learned man.  Or do you study geometry or astrology?”  “None of them.”  “Do you mean to be a reciter of heroic verses?” continued Socrates, “for I have been told that you have all Homer’s works.”  “Not in the least,” answered Euthydemus, “for I have observed that men of that profession know indeed a great many verses by heart, but for anything else they are for the most part very impertinent.”  “Perhaps you are in love with that noble science that makes politicians and economists, and that renders men capable to govern, and to be useful to others and to themselves?”  “That is what I endeavour to learn,” said Euthydemus, “and what I passionately p. 152desire to know.”  “It is a sublime science,” replied Socrates; “it is that we call the royal science, because it truly is the science of kings.  But have you weighed this point, whether a man can excel in that science without being an honest man?”  “I have,” said the young man, “and am even of opinion that none but honest men can be good citizens.”  “And are you an honest man?” said Socrates.  “I hope I am,” answered Euthydemus, “as honest a man as another.”  “Tell me,” said Socrates, “can we know who are honest men by what they do, as we know what trade a man is of by his work?”  “We may.”  “Then,” said Socrates, “as architects show us their works, can honest men show us theirs likewise?”  “No doubt of it,” replied Euthydemus; “and it is no difficult task to show you which are the works of justice, and which those of injustice, that we so often hear mentioned.”  “Shall we,” said Socrates, “make two characters, the one (J) to signify justice, the other (I) to denote injustice; and write under one of them all the works that belong to justice, and under the other all that belong to injustice?”  “Do,” said Euthydemus, “if you think fit.”

Socrates, having done what he proposed, continued thus his discourse:—“Do not men tell lies?”  “Very often,” answered Euthydemus.  “Under which head shall we put lying?”  “Under that of injustice,” said Euthydemus.  “Do not men sometimes cheat?”  “Most certainly.”  “Where shall we put cheating?” said Socrates.  “Under injustice.”  “And doing wrong to one’s neighbour?”  “There too.”  “And selling of free persons into slavery?”  “Still in the same place.”  “And shall we write none of all these,” said Socrates, “under the head of justice?”  “Not p. 153one of them,” answered Euthydemus; “it would be strange if we did.”  “But what,” replied Socrates, “when a general plunders an enemy’s city, and makes slaves of all the inhabitants, shall we say that he commits an injustice?”  “By no means.”  “Shall we own, then, that he does an act of justice?”  “Without doubt.”  “And when he circumvents his enemies in the war, does he not do well?”  “Very well.”  “And when he ravages their land, and takes away their cattle and their corn, does he not do justly?”  “It is certain he does,” said Euthydemus; “and when I answered you that all these actions were unjust, I thought you had spoken of them in regard only of friend to friend.”  “We must, therefore,” replied Socrates, “put among the actions of justice those very actions we have ascribed to injustice, and we will only establish this distinction, that it is just to behave ourselves so towards our enemies; but that to treat our friends thus is an injustice, because we ought to live with them uprightly, and without any deceit.”  “I think so,” said Euthydemus.  “But,” continued Socrates, “when a general sees that his troops begin to be disheartened, if he make them believe that a great reinforcement is coming to him, and by that stratagem inspires fresh courage into the soldiers, under what head shall we put this lie?”  “Under the head of justice,” answered Euthydemus.  “And when a child will not take the physic that he has great need of, and his father makes it be given him in a mess of broth, and by that means the child recovers his health, to which shall we ascribe this deceit?”  “To justice likewise.”  “And if a man, who sees his friend in despair, and fears he will kill himself, hides his sword from him, or takes it out of his hands by force, what p. 154shall we say of this violence?”  “That it is just,” replied Euthydemus.  “Observe what you say,” continued Socrates; “for it follows from your answers that we are not always obliged to live with our friends uprightly, and without any deceit, as we agreed we were.”  “No; certainly we are not, and if I may be permitted to retract what I said, I change my opinion very freely.”  “It is better,” said Socrates, “to change an opinion than to persist in a wrong one.  But there is still one point which we must not pass over without inquiry, and this relates to those whose deceits are prejudicial to their friends; for I ask you, which are most unjust, they who with premeditate design cheat their friends, or they who do it through inadvertency?”  “Indeed,” said Euthydemus, “I know not what to answer, nor what to believe, for you have so fully refuted what I have said, that what appeared to me before in one light appears to me now in another.  Nevertheless, I will venture to say that he is the most unjust who deceives his friend deliberately.”  “Do you think,” said Socrates, “that one may learn to be just and honest, as well as we learn to read and write?”  “I think we may.”  “Which,” added Socrates, “do you take to be the most ignorant, he who reads wrong on purpose, or he who reads wrong because he can read no better?”  “The last of them,” answered Euthydemus; “for the other who mistakes for pleasure need not mistake when he pleases.”  “Then,” inferred Socrates, “he who reads wrong deliberately knows how to read; but he who reads wrong without design is an ignorant man.”  “You say true.”  “Tell me likewise,” pursued Socrates, “which knows best what ought to be done, and what belongs to justice, he who lies and cheats with premeditate design, or he who deceives without p. 155intention to deceive?”  “It is most plain,” said Euthydemus, “that it is he who deceives with premeditate design.”  “But you said,” replied Socrates, “that he who can read is more learned than he who cannot read?”  “I did so.”  “Therefore he who best knows which are the duties of justice is more just than he that knows them not.”  “It seems to be so,” answered Euthydemus, “and I know not well how I came to say what I did.”  “Indeed,” said Socrates, “you often change your opinion, and contradict what you say; and what would you yourself think of any man who pretended to tell the truth, and yet never said the same thing; who, in pointing out to you the same road, should show you sometimes east, sometimes west, and who, in telling the same sum, should find more money at one time than another; what would you think of such a man?”  “He would make all men think,” answered Euthydemus, “that he knew nothing of what he pretended to know.”