Kant's Critique of Judgement


Index



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KANT'S
CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
LONDON * BOMBAY * CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK * BOSTON * CHICAGO
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THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF
JUDGEMENT

TRANSLATED
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY
J. H. BERNARD, D.D., D.C.L.
BISHOP OF OSSORY

SOMETIME FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, AND ARCHBISHOP KING'S PROFESSOR
OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN

SECOND EDITION, REVISED

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1914

COPYRIGHT

First Edition 1892
Second Edition 1914

v

CONTENTS

PAGE
Editor's Introduction xi
Preface 1
Introduction 7
I. Of the division of Philosophy 7
II. Of the realm of Philosophy in general 11
III. Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole 14
IV. Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori 17
V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgement 20
VI. Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature 27
VII. Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature 30
VIII. Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature 35
IX. Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgement 39
First Part.—Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement 43
First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement 45
First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful 45
First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality 45
1. The judgement of taste is aesthetical 45
2. The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested 46
3. The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest 48
4. The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest 50
5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction 53vi
Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to quantity 55
6. The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction 55
7. Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic 57
8. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective 59
9. Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object 63
Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein 67
10. Of purposiveness in general 67
11. The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation) 69
12. The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds 70
13. The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion 72
14. Elucidation by means of examples 73
15. The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection 77
16. The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure 81
17. Of the Ideal of Beauty 84
Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object 91
18. What the modality in a judgement of taste is 91
19. The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is conditioned 92
20. The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense 92
21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense? 93
22. The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense 94
General remark on the first section of the Analytic 96vii
Second Book.—Analytic of the Sublime 101
23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime 101
24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime 105
A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime 106
25. Explanation of the term "Sublime" 106
26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime 110
27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime 119
B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature 123
28. Of Nature regarded as Might 123
29. Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature 130
General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgement 132
Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements 150
30. The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful 150
31. Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste 152
32. First peculiarity of the judgement of taste 154
33. Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste 157
34. There is no objective principle of taste possible 159
35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general 161
36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste 162
37. What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste 164
38. Deduction of judgements of taste 165
39. Of the communicability of a sensation 167
40. Of taste as a kind of sensus communis 169
41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful 173
42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful 176
43. Of Art in general 183
44. Of beautiful Art 185
45. Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature 187
46. Beautiful art is the art of genius 188
47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius 190viii
48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste 193
49. Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius 197
50. Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art 205
51. Of the division of the beautiful arts 206
52. Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product 214
53. Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts 215
54. Remark 220
Second Division.—Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement 229
55. 229
56. Representation of the antinomy of Taste 230
57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste 231
58. Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement 241
59. Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality 248
60. Appendix:—Of the method of Taste 253
Second Part.—Critique of the Teleological Judgement 257
61. Of the objective purposiveness of Nature 259
First Division.—Analytic of the Teleological Judgement 262
62. Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material 262
63. Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature 268
64. Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes 272
65. Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings 275
66. Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings 280
67. Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes 282
68. Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science 287
Second Division.—Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement 292ix
69. What is an antinomy of the Judgement? 292
70. Representation of this antinomy 293
71. Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy 296
72. Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of Nature 298
73. None of the above systems give what they pretend 302
74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable 306
75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement 309
76. Remark 313
77. Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible 319
78. Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature 326
Appendix.—Methodology of the Teleological Judgement 334
79. Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature 334
80. Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose 336
81. Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product 342
82. Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings 346
83. Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system 352
84. Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself 359
85. Of Physico-theology 362
86. Of Ethico-theology 370x
87. Of the moral proof of the Being of God 377
88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof 384
89. Of the use of the moral argument 392
90. Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God 395
91. Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith 403
General remark on Teleology 414


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