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Auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are,
when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to
assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did Pope
Julius use, who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary
soldiers in the enterprize of Ferrara, applied himself to the
Auxiliaries, and agreed with Ferdinand King of Spain, that with his
Forces he should aid him. These armes may be profitable and
advantagious for themselves; but for him that calls them in,
hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated; and
conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. And however that of these
examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will I not part
from this of Pope Julius the second, which is as yet fresh: whose
course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he
had to get Ferrara, putting himself wholly into strangers hands:
but his good fortune caused another cause to arise, that hindred
him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice; for his
Auxiliaries being broken at Ravenna, and the Swissers thereupon
arriving, who put the Conquerors to flight beyond all opinion, even
their own and others, he chanced not to remain his enemies
prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to his
Auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. The
Florentines being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand French to
Pisa for to take it: by which course they ran more hazzard, than in
any time of their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to
oppress his neighbors, brought into Greece ten thousand Turks, who
when the war was ended, could not be got out thence, which was the
beginning of Greeces servitude under the Infidels. He then that
will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himself of these
armes; for they are much {308} more dangerous than the mercenaries;
for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed; for they are all
united, and all bent to the obedience of another. But for the
mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have vanquished, there is no
more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united
in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third
that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so great
authority, that he can endammage thee. In summe, in the mercenaries
their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the
auxiliaries their valour. Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes
avoyded these kind of armes, and betaken himselfe to his owne, and
desired rather to loss with his owne, than conquer with anothers,
accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others
armes. I will not doubt to alleadge Cæsar Borgia, and his
actions. This Duke entred into Romania with auxiliarie armes,
bringing with him all French souldiers: but afterwards not
accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to mercenaries,
judging lesse danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the Orsini
and the Vitelli, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding
wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguishd, and betook
himselfe to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd what
difference there is between the one and the other of these armes,
considering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation,
when he had the French men alone, and when he had the Orsini and
Vitelli; but when he remaind with his own, and stood of himselfe,
we shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of grate
esteeme, but when every one saw, that he wholly possessed his owne
armes. I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of
late memory; but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the
Siracusan, being one of those I formerly nam'd. This man (as I said
before) being made general of the Siracusans forces, knew presently
that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they
were hirelings, as our Italians are; and finding no way either to
hold, or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces, and
afterwards waged warre with his owne men, and {309} none
others. I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament
serving just to this purpose. When David presented himselfe before
Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistins Champion, Saul to
encourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which David when he
had them upon back, refused, saying, he was not able to make any
proofe of himself therein, and therefore would goe meet the enemy
with his own sling and sword. In summe, others armes either fall
from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. Charls the
seventh, Father of Lewis the eleventh, having by his good fortune
and valour set France at liberty from the English, knew well this
necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his
Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes, and infantry. Afterwards
King Lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry, and began to
take the Swissers to pay; which errour follow'd by the others, is
(as now indeed it appeares) the cause of that Kingdomes dangers.
For having given reputation to the Swissers, they have renderd all
their own armes contemptible; for this hath wholly ruind their
foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for being
accustomed to serve with the Swissers, they think they are not able
to overcome without them. From whence it comes that the French are
not of force against the Swissers, and without them also against
others they use not to adventure. Therefore are the French armies
mixt, part mercenaries, and part natives, which armes are farre
better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much
inferiour to the natives; and let the said example suffice for
that: for the Kingdome of France would have been unconquerable, if
Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind: but men in
their small wisdome begin a thing, which then because it hath some
favour of good, discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder, as
I before said of the hectick feavers. Wherefore that Prince which
perceives not mischiefes, but as they grow up, is not truely wise;
and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruine of
the Romane Empire, we shall find it was from taking the Goths first
{310} into their pay; for from that beginning
the forces of the Romane Empire began to grow weak, and all the
valour that was taken hence was given to them. I conclude then that
without having armes of their owne, no Principality can be secure,
or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune, not having valour to
shelter it in adversity. And it was alwayes the opinion and saying
of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsetled, as is the
reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces: which
are those that are composed of thy subjects, or Citizens, or
servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner
how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders
above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but
consider'd, how Philip Alexander the Great his Father, and in what
manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed
themselves, to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly.
What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline.
prince then
ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take any thing
else for his proper art, but warr, and the orders and discipline
thereof: for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that
commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that
are borne Princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from
a private fortune to that dignity. And it is seene by the contrary,
that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights,
than to the warres, they have lost their States; and the first
cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the
cause that makes thee gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and
approvd in that arte. Francis Sforza by being a man at armes, of a
{311} private man became Duke of Milan; and
his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines
belonging to those imployments of Princes, became private men. For
among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it
causes thee to be contemnd, which is one of those disgraces, from
which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe, as hereafter shall be sayd:
for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no
proportion; and reason will not, that he who is in armes, should
willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them, and
that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed
vassalls; for there being disdaine in the one, and suspicion in the
other, it is impossible these should ever well cooperate. And
therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienced in matter of warre,
besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said, cannot
be had in any esteeme among his souldiers, nor yet trust in them.
Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of
warre, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the
warre; which he may be able to doe two wayes; the one practically,
and in his labours and recreations of his body, the other
theoretically. And touching the practick part, he ought besides the
keeping of his own subjects well traind up in the discipline and
exercise of armes, give himselfe much to the chase, whereby to
accustome his body to paines, and partly to understand the manner
of situations, and to know how the mountaines arise, which way the
vallyes open themselves, and how the plaines are distended flat
abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marrish
ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is
profitable in two kinds: first he learnes thereby to know his own
countrey, and is the better enabled to understand the defence
thereof, and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience
in these situations, easily comprehends any other situation, which
a new he hath need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies,
plaines, rivers, and marrish places. For example, they in Tuscany
are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge
of {312} the site of one country, it is easie to
attain to know that of others. And that Prince that wants this
skill, failes of the principall part a Commander should be furnisht
with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch
the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also
to besiege a town at thy best advantage, Philopomenes Prince of the
Achayans, among other praises Writers give him, they say, that in
time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the
practise of warre; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to
disport himselfe with his friends, would often stand still, and
discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that
hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the
advantage, and how might we safely goe to find them, keeping still
our orders; and if we would retire our selves, what course should
we take if they retir'd, how should we follow them? and thus on the
way, propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army;
would heare their opinions, and tell his owne, and confirme it by
argument; so that by his continuall thought hereupon, when ever he
led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy.
But touching the exercise of the mind, a Prince ought to read
Histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men,
marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the
occasions of their victories, and their losses; wherby they may be
able to avoyd these, and obtaine those; and above all, doe as
formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to
imitate, if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory
glorious; the course he took, and kept alwaies near unto him the
remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that
Alexander the great imitated Achilles; Cæsar Alexander, and
Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by
Xenophon, may easily perceive afterwards in Scipio's life how much
glory his imitation gaind him, and how much Scipio did conforme
himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with
those things, that are written by Xenophon of Cyrus. {313} Such like
wayes ought a wise Prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times,
but by his paines then, as it were provide himself of store,
whereof he may make some use in his adversity, the end that when
the times change, he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard
fortune.
Of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially
Princes, are praised, or dispraised.
