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here
remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical
Principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they
are gotten: for they are attained to either by vertue, or Fortune;
and without the one or the other they are held: for they are
maintaind by orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so
powerfull and of such nature, that they maintain their Princes in
their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. These
only have an Estate and defend it not; have subjects and govern
them not; and yet their States because undefended, are not taken
from them; nor their subjects, though not govern'd, care not, think
not, neither are able to aliene themselves from them. These
Principalities then are only happy and secure: but they being
sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding
reaches not, I will not meddle with them: for being set up and
maintained by God, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash
man to enter into discourse of them. Yet if any man should ask me
whence it proceeds, that the Church in temporal power hath attaind
to such greatness, seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt,
the Italian Potentates, {300} and not only they who are entituled the
potentates, but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest
condition in regard of the temporality, made but small account of
it; and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof; and it
hath been able to drive him out of Italy, and ruine the Venetians;
and however this be well known, me thinks it is not superstitious
in some part to recall it to memory. Before that Charles King of
France past into Italy, this countrey was under the rule of the
Pope, Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the
Florentines. These Potentates took two things principally to their
care; the one, that no forreiner should invade Italy; the other
that no one of them should inlarge their State. They, against whom
this care was most taken, were the Pope and the Venetians; and to
restrain the Venetians, there needed the union of all the rest, as
it was in the defence of Ferrara; and to keep the Pope low, they
served themselves of the Barons of Rome, who being divided into two
factions, the Orsini and Colonnesi, there was alwaies occasion of
offence between them, who standing ready with their armes in hand
in the view of the Pope, held the Popedome weak and feeble: and
however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope, as was Sextus; yet
either his fortune, or his wisdome was not able to free him of
these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause
thereof; for in ten years, which time, one with another, Popes
ordinarily liv'd, with much ado could they bring low one of the
factions. And if, as we may say, one had near put out the
Colonnesi, there arose another enemy to the Orsini, who made them
grow again, so that there was never time quite to root them out.
This then was the cause, why the Popes temporal power was of small
esteem in Italy; there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt,
who of all the Popes that ever were, shewed what a Pope was able to
do with money and forces: and he effected, by means of his
instrument, Duke Valentine, and by the ocasion of the French mens
passage, all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in
the Dukes actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to
{301} inlarge the Church dominions, but to
make the Duke great; yet what he did, turnd to the Churches
advantage, which after his death when the Duke was taken away, was
the heir of all his pains. Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius, and
found the Church great, having all Romania, and all the Barons of
Rome being quite rooted out, and by Alexanders persecutions, all
their factions worne down; he found also the way open for the
heaping up of moneys, never practised before Alexanders time; which
things Julius not only follow'd, but augmented; and thought to make
himself master of Bolonia, and extinguish the Venetians, and chase
the French men out of Italy: and these designes of his prov'd all
lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that he did all
for the good of the Church, and in no private regard: he kept also
the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi, in the same State he
found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to
cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one
the power of the Church, which somewhat affrights them; the other
because they have no Cardinals of their factions, who are the
primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these
parties ever be at rest, while they have Cardinals; because they
nourish the factions both in Rome, and abroad; and the Barons then
are forced to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the
Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons.
And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedome exceeding
puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by armes,
he by his goodness, and infinite other vertues, will much more
advantage and dignifie it.
{302}
How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching
Mercenary soldiers.
aving
treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities,
which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon, and
considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being,
and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain, and hold
them, it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and
defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. We have
formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good
foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack.
The Principal foundations that all States have, as well new, as
old, or mixt, are good laws, and good armes; and because there
cannot be good laws, where there are not good armes; and where
there are good armes, there must needs be good laws, I will omit to
discourse of the laws, and speak of armes. I say then that the
armes, wherewithall a Prince defends his State, either are his own,
or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt. Those that are mercenary and
auxiliar, are unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his
State founded upon mercenary armes, he shall never be quiet, nor
secure, because they are never well united, ambitious, and without
discipline, treacherous, among their friends stour, among their
enemies cowardly; they have no fear of God, nor keep any faith with
men; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief, till the
enemy comes to assul thee; and in time of peace thou art despoyled
by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is, because they
have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the field, but
only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them willing to
hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be thy
soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or
{303} run away; which thing would cost me but
small pains to perswade; for the ruine of Italy hath not had any
other cause now a dayes, than for that it hath these many years
rely'd upon mercenary armes; which a good while since perhaps may
have done some man some service, and among themselves they may have
been thought valiant: but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared,
they quickly shewed what they were. Whereupon Charles the King of
France, without opposition, made himself master of all Italy: and
he that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true;
but these were not those they beleeved, but what I have told; and
because they were the Princes faults, they also have suffered the
punishment. I will fuller shew the infelicity of these armes. The
mercenary Captains are either very able men, or not: if they be,
thou canst not repose any trust in them: for they will alwaies
aspire unto their own proper advancements, either by suppressing of
thee that art their Lord, or by suppressing of some one else quite
out of thy purpose: but if the Captain be not valorous, he
ordinarily ruines thee: and in case it be answered, that whoever
shall have his armes in his hands, whether mercenary or not, will
do so: I would reply, that armes are to be imployed either by a
Prince, or Common-wealth. The Prince ought to go in person, and
performe the office of a commander: the Republick is to send forth
her Citizens: and when she sends forth one that proves not of
abilities, she ought to change him then; and when he does prove
valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his
commission. And by experience we see, that Princes and Republiques
of themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary
armes never do other than harme; and more hardly falls a Republick
armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own
Citizens, than one that is armed by forrein armes. Rome and Sparta
subsisted many ages armed and free. The Swissers are exceedingly
well armed, and yet very free. Touching mercenary armes that were
of old, we have an example of the Carthagians, who near upon were
oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers, when the first war
{304} with the Romans was finished; however
the Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains. Philip
of Macedon was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death,
General of their Armies; and after the victory, he took from them
liberty. The Milaneses when Duke Philip was dead, entertaind
Francis Sforza into their pay against the Venetians, who having
vanquisht their enemie at Caravaggio, afterwards joyned with them,
where by to usurp upon the Milaneses his Masters. Sforza his
father, being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay, left her on a sudden
disarmed; whereupon she, to save her Kingdom, was constraind to
cast her self into the King of Arrragon's bosome. And in case the
Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their State
with these kind of armes, and their own Captains, and yet none of
them have ever made themselves their Princes, but rather defended
them: I answer, that the Florentines in this case have had fortune
much their friend: for of valorous Captains, which they might any
way fear, some have not been victors, some have had opposition, and
others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way. He who
overcame not, was John Aouto, of whose faith there could no proof
be made, being he vanquisht not; but every one will acknowledge,
that, had he vanquisht, the Florentines were at his discretion.
Sforza had alwaies the Bracceschi for his adversaries, so that they
were as a guard one upon another. Francis converted all his
ambition against Lombardy. Braccio against the Church, and the
Kingdome of Naples. But let us come to that which followed a while
agoe. The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their General, a throughly
advis'd man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very great
reputation: had he taken Pisa, no man will deny but that the
Florentines must have held fast with him; for had he been
entertained in their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they
themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. The
Venetians, if we consider their proceedings, we shall see wrought
both warily and gloriously, while themselves made war, which was
before their undertakings by land, where the gentlemen {305} with
their own Commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely: but when
they began to fight by land, they lost their valor, and follow'd
the customes of Italy; and in the beginning of their enlargement by
land, because they had not much territory, and yet were of great
reputation, they had not much cause to fear their Captains; but as
they began to extend their bounds, which was under their Commander
Carminiola, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was
exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the Duke of
Milan; and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war,
they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him;
and because they neither would, nor could cashier him, that they
might not lose what they had gotten, they were forced for their own
safeties to put him to death. Since they have had for their General
Bartholomew of Berganio, Robert of St. Severin, the Count of
Petilian, and such like: whereby they were to fear their losses, as
well as to hope for gain: as it fell out afterwards at Vayla, where
in one day they lost that, which with so much pains they had gotten
in eight hundred years: for from these kind of armes grow slack and
slow and weak gains; but sudden and wonderfull losses: And because
I am now come with these examples into Italy, which now these many
years, have been governd by mercenary armes, I will search deeper
into them, to the end that their course and progress being better
discoverd, they may be the better amended. You have to understand,
that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the Italian Empire
began to be shaken off, and the Pope had gotten reputation in the
temporality, Italy was divided into several States: for many of the
great cities took armes against their Nobility; who under the
Emperors protection had held them in oppression; and the Pope
favored these, whereby he might get himself reputation, in the
temporality; of many others, their Citizens became Princes, so that
hereupon Italy being come into the Churches hands as it were, and
some few Republicks, those Priests and Citizens not accustomed to
the use of armes, began to take strangers to their pay. The first
that gave {306} reputation to these soldiers was
Alberick of Como in Romania. From his discipline among others
descended Brachio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbitres
of Italy; after these followed all others, who even till our dayes
have commanded the armes of Italy; and the success of their valor
hath been, that it was overrun by Charles, pillaged by Lewis,
forc'd by Ferdinand, and disgrac'd by the Swissers. The order which
they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to
their own armes to take away the credit of the Infantry. This they
did, because they having no State of their own, but living upon
their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many
they were not able to maintain; whereupon they reduc'd themselves
to cavalery, and so with a supportable number they were entertained
and honored: and matters were brought to such termes, that in an
army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand
foot. They had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves and
their soldiers of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not
killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for
their freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor
made palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the
summer: and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of
among them in their military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid
pains and dangers, insomuch as they have brought Italy into slavery
and disgrace.
{307}
Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixt, and native.
