Page 62 of 68
In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth Chap, our Author
descends to particulars, perswading his Prince in his sixteenth to
{324} such a suppleness of disposition, as
that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or
miserableness, as need shall require. But that of liberality is to
last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe: which
if he well weigh, is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it
seems; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. In the
seventeenth Chap, he treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of
which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but
as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. And lest the
Prince should incline too much to clemency, our Author allows
rather the restraint by fear, than by love. The contrary to which
all stories shew us. I will say this only, cruelty may cut of the
power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to
most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge. In the
eighteenth Chap, our Author discourses how Princes ought to govern
themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he sayes they
ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather they should know
by their craft how to turne and wind men about, whereby to take
advantage of all winds and fortunes. To this I would oppose that in
the fifteenth Psal. v. 5. He that sweareth to his neighbor, and
disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance. It was
a King that writ it, and me thinks the rule he gave, should well
befit both King and Subject: and surely this perswades against all
taking of advantages. A man may reduce all the causes of
faith-breaking to three heads. One may be, because he that
promised, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked
and malitious way of dealing. A second may bee, because hee that
promisd, repents of his promise made; and that is grounded on
unconstancy, and lightness in that he would not be well resolved
before he entred into covenant. The third may be, when it so falls
out, that it lyes not in his power that made the promise to
performe it. In which case a man ought to imitate the good debter,
who having not wherewithall to pay, hides not himself, but presents
his person to his creditor, willingly suffering imprisonment. The
first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a Prince: in the
third, men might well be directed by the examples of those two
famous Romans, Regulus and Posthumius. I shall close this with the
answer of Charles the fifth, when he was pressed to break his word
with Luther for his safe return from Wormes; Fides rerum
promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem cam
consistere oportet. Though truth be banisht out of the whole
world, yet should it alwaies find harbour in an Emperors
breast.
Gulielmus Xenocarus in vit. Car. Quinti.
{325}
That Princes should take a care, not to incurre contempt or
hatred.
ut because
among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, I have
spoken of those of most importance, I will treat of the others more
briefly under these qualityes that a Prince is to beware, as in
part is above-said, and that he fly those things which cause him to
be odious or vile: and when ever he shall avoid this, he shall
fully have plaid his part, and in the other disgraces he shall find
no danger at all. There is nothing makes him so odious, as I said,
as his extortion of his subjects goods, and abuse of their women,
from which he ought to forbear; and so long as he wrongs not his
whole people, neither in their goods, nor honors, they live
content, and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some few:
which many waies and easily too, is restrain'd. To be held various,
light, effeminate, faint-hearted, unresolv'd, these make him be
contemnd and thought base, which a Prince should shun like rocks,
and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity,
courage, gravity, and valor; and that in all the private affairs of
his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand irrevocable: and
maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think either to
deceive or wind and turn him about: that Prince that gives such an
opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so
well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or
by forreiners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth,
and how much he is reverenced by his subjects: For a Prince ought
to have two fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects;
the other from abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbors; from
these he defends himself by good armes and good friends; and
alwayes he shall have {326} good friends, if he have good armes; and
all things shall alwaies stand sure at home, when those abroad are
firme, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them; and however
the forrein matters stand but ticklishly; yet if he have taken such
courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescribed, he shall never be
able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all possibility,
force and violence, as I said Nabis the Spartan did: but touching
his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are setled, it is to be
fear'd they may conspire privily; from which a Prince sufficiently
secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping
himself in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him
to compass, as formerly we treated at large. And one of the
powerfullest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies, is,
not to be hated nor dispised by the universality; for alwaies he
that conspires, beleeves the Princes death is acceptable to the
subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the
heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on
the conspirators side, are infinite. By experience it is plain,
that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have
succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can
he take the company of any, but of those, who he beleeves are
malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a
malecontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by
revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour:
so that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other,
finding only doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend,
or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince, if he
keeps his word with thee. And to reduce this matter into short
termes: I say, there is nothing but jealousie, fear, and suspect of
punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the
Princes part, there is the majesty of the principality, the laws,
the defences of his friends and the State, which do so guard him,
that to all these things the peoples good wills being added, it is
unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire; for
ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his
mischiefe, {327} in this case he is also to feare
afterwards, having the people for his enemy when the fact is
commited, and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for
any refuge. Touching this matter, many examples might be brought;
but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the
memory of our Fathers. Annibal Bentivolii, grand Father of this
Annibal who now lives, that was Prince in Bolonia, being slaine by
the Canneschi that conspir'd against him, none of his race being
left, but this John, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the
people rose upon this murder, and slew all the Canneschi which
proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the
Bentivolii held then in Bolonia: which was so great, that being
there remain'd not any, now Anniball was dead, that was able to
manage the State; and having notice that in Florence there was one
borne of the Bentivolii, who till then was taken for a Smiths
sonne: the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him, and gave
the government of their City to him, which was rul'd by him, untill
John was of fit yeares to governe. I conclude then, that a Prince
ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the people
to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well
feare every thing, and every one. And well ordered States, and
discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence, not to cause
their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the
people, and so to maintaine them: for this is one of the most
important businesses belonging to a Prince. Among the Kingdomes
that are well orderd and governd in our dayes, is that of France,
and therein are found exceeding many good orders, whereupon the
Kings liberty and security depends: of which the chiefe is the
Parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded that
Kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and
judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them; and
on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the
great ones, grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would
not lay this care wholly upon the King, but take this trouble from
him, which he {328} might have with the great men, in case
he favourd the Commonalty; or with the Commonalty, in case he
favourd the great men; and thereupon set up a third judge, which
was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and
favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the King. It was
not possible to take a better, nor wiser course then this; nor a
surer way to secure the King, and the Kingdome. From whence we may
draw another conclusion worthie of note, that Princes ought to
cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation;
and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. Here
againe I conclude, that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his
Nobility; but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred: It would
seeme perhaps to many, considering the life and death of many
Romane Emperours, that they were examples contrary to my opinion,
finding that some have liv'd worthily, and shewd many rare vertues
of the minde, and yet have lost the Empire, and been put to death
by their owne subjects, conspiring against them. Intending then to
answer these objections, I shall discourse upon the qualities of
some Emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not
disagreeing from that which I have alledgd; and part thereof I will
bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be
noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall
suffice me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire
from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus, who were Mercus and
Commodus his sonne, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla
his sonne, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximin. And
first it is to be noted, that where in the other Principalities,
they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles, and the
insolence of the people; the Romane Emperours had a third
difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the
souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it caused the ruine of
many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the people; for the
people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest Princes; and
the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent,
{329} cruell, and plucking from every one:
which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby
they might be able to double their stipends, and satisfie their
avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeds, that those Emperours who
either by Nature or by Art, had not such a reputation, as therewith
they could curbe the one and the other, were alwayes ruind: and the
most of them, specially those who as new men came to the
principality, finding the difficulty of those two different
humours, applyed themselves to content the souldiers, making small
account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary;
for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one,
ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole
universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to
provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those
universalities that are the most mighty. And therefore those
Emperors, who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire, had
need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the
soldiers, than to the people; which neverthelesse turnd to their
advantage, or otherwise, according as that Prince knew how to
maintaine his repute with them. From these causes aforesayd
proceeded it, that Marcus Pertinax, and Alexander, though all
living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty,
courteous and bountifull, had all from Marcus on ward, miserable
ends; Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for he came
to the Empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either
from the soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being
accompanyed with many vertues, which made him venerable, he held
alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their
limits, and was never either hated, or contemnd. But Pertinax was
created Emperour against the soldiers wills, who being accustomed
to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure that honest
course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to: Whereupon having
gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added contempt, in that
he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government.
Whence it ought to be {330} observed, that hatred is gaind as well
by good deeds as bad; and therefore as I formerly said, when a
Prince would maintaine the State, he is often forced not to be
good: for when that generality, whether it be the people, or
soldiers, or Nobility, whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to
maintain thee, is corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their
humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy
adversaries. But let us come to Alexander who was of that
goodnesse, that among the prayses given him, had this for one, that
in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire, he never put any man
to death, but by course of justice; neverthelesse being held
effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his
mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspird
against him. Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of
Commodus, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you shall
find them exceeding cruell, and ravinous, who to satisfie their
soldiers, forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the
people; and all of them, except Severus, came to evill ends: for in
Severus, there was such extraordinary valour, that while he held
the soldiers his freinds, however the people were much burthend by
him, he might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him so
admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights; that these in a
manner stood amazd and astonishd, and those others reverencing and
honoring him. And because the actions of this man were exceeding
great, being in a new Prince, I will briefly shew how well he knew
to act the Foxes and the Lions parts; the conditions of which two,
I say, as before, are very necessary for a Prince to imitate.
Severus having had experience of Julian the Emperours sloth,
perswaded his army (whereof he was commander in Sclavonia) that
they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Pertinax his death,
who was put to death by the Imperiall guard; and under this
pretence, not making any shew that he aspird unto the Empire, set
his army in march directly towards Rome, and was sooner come into
Italy, than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station. Being
ariv'd at Rome, he {331} was by the Senate chosen Emperour for
feare, and Julian slaine. After this beginning, two difficulties
yet remaind to Severus, before he could make himselfe Lord of the
whole State; the one in Asia, where Niger the Generall of those
armies had gotten the title of Emperour, the other in the West with
Albinus, who also aspird to the Empire: and because he thought
there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both,
he purposed to set upon Niger, and cozen Albinus, to whom he writ,
that being elected Emperour by the Senate, he would willingly
communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of
Cæsar, and by resolution of the Senate, tooke him to him for
his Colleague; which things were taken by Albinus in true meaning.
But afterwards when Severus had overcome and slaine Niger, and
pacified the affaires and in the East, being returned to Rome, he
complaind in the Senate of Albinus, how little weighing the
benefits received from him, he had sought to slay him by treason,
and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude:
afterwards he went into France, where he bereft him both of his
State and life, whoever then shall in particular examine his
actions, shall finde he was a very cruell Lion, and as crafty a
Fox: and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by
every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell
that he being a new man, was able to hold together such a great
Empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from
that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have
conceiv'd against him. But Antonius his sonne, was also an
exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities,
which causd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to the
souldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of
travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of
effeminacy, which gaind him the love of all the armies:
neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such, and so
hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a great
part of the people of Rome, and all those of Alexandria, that he
grew odious to the world, and began to be feard by those
{332} also that were neare about him; so that
he was slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army. Where
it is to be noted, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon
the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a
Prince be avoyded: for every one that feares not to dye, is able to
doe it; but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it because it very
seldome falls out. Only should he beware not to doe any extreame
injury to any of those of whom he serves himself, or that he hath
near about him in any imployment of his Principality, as Antonius
did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion; also
threatned him every day, and neverthelesse entertaind him still as
one of the guards of his body, which was a rash course taken, and
the way to destruction, as befell him. But let us come to Commodus
for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire, by reason it
descended upon him by inheritance, being Marcus his sonne, and it
had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then
had he contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a
cruell and savage disposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon
the people, he gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all
licentiousnesse. On the other part not maintaining his dignity, but
often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers, and doing
such other like base things, little worthy of the Imperiall
majesty, he became contemptible in the soldiers sight; and being
hated of one part, and despisd of the other, he was conspird
against, and slaine. It remaines now, that we declare Maximinus his
conditions, who was a very warlike man; and the armies loathing
Alexanders effeminacy, whereof I spake before, when they had slain
him, chose this man Emperour, who not long continued so, because
two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt;
the one because he was very base, having kept cattell in Thrace,
which was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him;
the other, because in the beginning of his Principality having
delayd to goe to Rome, and enter into possession of the Imperiall
throne, he had gaind the infamy of being thought {333} exceeding
cruell, having by his Prefects in Rome, and in every place of the
Empire, exercisd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world
being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his
blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for
feare of his crulty; first Affrica, afterwards the Senate, with all
the people of Rome and all Italy, conspired against him, with whom
his own army took part; which incamping before Aquileya, and
finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his
cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him
the lesse, slew him. I purpose not to say any thing either of
Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who because they were throughly
base, were sudenly extinguished: but I will come to the conclusion
of this discourse; and I say, that the Princes of our times have
lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Soldiers extraordinarily
in their government; for notwithstanding that there be some
considerations to be had of them, yet presently are those armies
dissolved, because none of these Princes do use to maintaine any
armies together, which are annex'd and inveterated with the
governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the Romane
Empire. And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content
the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more
powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all
Princes, (except the Turk and the Souldan) to satisfie their people
than their soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they;
wherein I except the Turk, he alwayes maintaining about his person
12000 foot, and 15000 horse, upon which depends the safety and
strength of his Kingdome; and it is necessary that laying aside all
other regard of his people, he maintaine these his friends. The
Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto, which being wholy in the
souldiers power, he must also without respect of his people keep
them his friends. And you are to consider, that this State of the
Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities: For it is
very like the Papacy, which cannot be termd an hereditary
Principality: nor a new Principality: for the sons of the deceasd
Prince are {334} not heires and Lords thereof, but he
that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the
authority in them. And this order being of antiquity, cannot be
termd a new Principality, because therein are none of those
difficulties that are in new ones: for though the Prince be new,
yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordaind to receive
him, as if he were their hereditary Prince. But let us returne to
our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall
perceive that either hatred, or contempt have caus'd the ruine of
the afore-named Emperors; and shall know also, from it came that
part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of
them the one had a happy success, and the others unhappy: for it
was of no availe, but rather hurtful for Pertinax and Alexander,
because they were new Princes, to desire to imitate Marcus, who by
inheritance came to the Principality: and in like manner it was a
wrong to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximus, to imitate Severus,
because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow
his steps therein. Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality
cannot well imitate Marcus his actions; nor yet is it necessary to
follow those of Severus: but he ought make choyce of those parts in
Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State; and to
take from Marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a
State which is already established and setled.
{335}
Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often
make use of, are profitable or dammageable.
