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Princes, whereby they might safely keep their State, have disarmed
their subjects; some others have held the towns under their
dominion, divided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities
against themselves; others have appli'd themselves to gain them,
where they have suspected at their entrance into the government;
others have built Fortresses; and others again have ruined and
demolished them: and however that upon all these things, a man
cannot well pass a determinate sentence, unless one comes to the
particulars of these States, where some such like determinations
were to be taken; yet I shall speak of them in so large a manner,
as the matter of it self will bear. It was never then that a new
Prince would disarme his own subjects; but rather when he hath
found them disarmed, he hath alwaies arm'd them. For being belov'd,
those armes become thine; those become faithful, which thou hadst
in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintaind so; and
thy subjects are made thy partisans; and because all thy subjects
cannot be put in armes, when thou bestowest favors on those thou
armest, with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and
that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges
them to thee; those others excuse thee, judgeing it necessary that
they have deservd more, who have undergone more danger, and so have
greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to
offend them, that thou distrustest them, either for cowardise, or
small faith; and the one or the other of those two opinions
provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou canst not
stand disarmed, {336} thou must then turn thy self to
mercenary Soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and
when it is good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from
powerful enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as I have said,
a new Prince in a new Principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes.
Of examples to this purpose, Histories are full. But when a Prince
gains a new State, which as a member he adds to his ancient
dominions, then it is necessary to disarme that State, unless it be
those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the
conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is
necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them,
that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own Soldiers,
who live in thy ancient State near unto thee. Our ancestors and
they that were accounted Sages, were wont to say that it was
necessary to hold Pistoya in factions, and Pisa with Fortresses;
and for this cause maintaind some towns subject to them in
differences, whereby to hold it more easily. This, at what time
Italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner, might be well done; but
mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept; for I
do not beleeve, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must
needs be, that when the enemy approaches them, Cities divided are
presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the
forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist. The Venetians
(as I think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the factions
of the Guelfes and Gibellins, in their townes; and however they
never suffered them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd
these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd
in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as
it proved, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being
defeated at Vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage
and seizd upon their whole State. Therefore such like waies argue
the Princes weakness; for in a strong principality they never will
suffer such divisions; for they shew them some kind of profit in
time of peace, being they are able by means thereof more easily to
mannage their subjects: but war comming, such like orders discover
{337} their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes
become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions
that are made against them; and therefore Fortune especially when
she hath to make any new Prince great, who hath more need to gain
reputation than an hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise
against him, and him to undertake against them: to the end he may
have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his
enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. And
therefore many think, that a wise Prince when he hath the occasion,
ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing
thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes, especially
those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men,
who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than
in those who at their entrance have been their confidents.
Pandulphus Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governd his State, more with
them that had been suspected by him, than with the others. But of
this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according
to the subject; I will only say this, that those men, who in the
beginning of a Principality were once enemies, if they be of
quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support,
the Prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his;
and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully, insomuch as
they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel
that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the
Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who
serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. And seing the matter
requires it, I will not omit to put a Prince in mind, who hath anew
made himself master of a State, by means of the inward helps he had
from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that
favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards
him; for if it be only because they were not content with their
former government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be
able to keep them long his friends, because it will be impossible
for him to content them. By these examples then which are drawn out
of ancient and modern {338} affaires, searching into the cause
hereof, we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for
friends, who formerly were contented with the State, and therefore
were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented
therewith, became his fiends, and favor'd him in getting the
mastery of it. It hath been the custome of Princes, whereby to hold
their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might be
bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against
them, and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences. I
commend this course, because it hath been used of old;
notwithstanding Nicholas Vitelli in our dayes hath been known to
demolish two Citadels in the town of Castello, the better to keep
the State; Guidubaldo Duke of Urbin being to return into his State,
out of which he was driven by Cæsar Borgia, raz'd all the
Fortresses of that Countrey, and thought he should hardlyer lose
that State again without them. The Bentivolii returning into
Bolonia, used the like courses. Citadels then are profitable, or
not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one
part, they do thee harme in another; and this part may be argued
thus. That Prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of
strangers, ought to build Fortresses: but he that is more afraid of
strangers than of his people, should let them alone. Against the
house of Sforza, the Castle of Milan, which Francis Sforza built,
hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that State:
and therefore the best Citadel that may be, is not to incurre the
peoples hatred; for however thou holdest a Fortress, and the people
hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them; for people, when once they
have taken armes, never want the help of strangers at their need to
take ther parts. In our dayes we never saw that they ever profited
any Prince, unless it were the Countess of Furli, when Count
Hieronymo of Furli her husband was slain; for by means thereof she
escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from Milan, and so
recover'd her State: and then such were the times that the stranger
could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to
little purpose, when Cæsar Borgia assaild her, and that
{339} the people which was her enemy, sided
with the stranger. Therefore both then, and at first, it would have
been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people,
than to have held the Fortresses. These things being well weigh'd
then, I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses, and him
also that shall not; and I will blame him, howsoever he be, that
relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his
people.
How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation.
