Index
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics
II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty
III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty
IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?
V. Explanation of these two Notions
VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict, Obligation
VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties
(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty
(2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty
X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics is Synthetical
XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited
XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally
XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics
XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence
Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom.
XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself
XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)
If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science (systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end which is the matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). *
* One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not,
therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who
makes the rational end the principle of his actions, while
at the same time he joins with this the necessary knowledge
which, as it aims at action, must not be spun out into the
most subtile threads of metaphysic, unless a legal duty is
in question; in which case meum and tuum must be accurately
determined in the balance of justice, on the principle of
equality of action and action, which requires something like
mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere
ethical duty. For in this case the question is not only to
know what it is a duty to do (a thing which on account of
the ends that all men naturally have can be easily decided),
but the chief point is the inner principle of the will
namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the
spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the
man who joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that
he is a practical philosopher.
Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her "arms from the armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not, therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty, otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral, may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be consistent with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be dictated by reason, but only adopted instinctively and therefore blindly.
