Index

GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS
FOR
ENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.

EDITED BY
GEORGE S. MORRIS.

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LEIBNIZ'S NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

LEIBNIZ'S
NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION.

By JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D.,

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN, AND PROFESSOR (ELECT) OF MENTAL AND
MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF MINNESOTA

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CHICAGO:
SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY
1902

Copyright, 1888,
By S. C. Griggs and Company.

PREFACE.

The purpose of the series of which the present volume is one, is not, as will be seen by reference to the statement in the initial volume, to sum up in toto the system of any philosopher, but to give a "critical exposition" of some one masterpiece. In treating the "Nouveaux Essais" of Leibniz, I have found myself obliged, at times, to violate the letter of this expressed intention, in order to fulfil its spirit. The "Nouveaux Essais," in spite of its being one of the two most extended philosophical writings of Leibniz, is a compendium of comments, rather than a connected argument or exposition. It has all the suggestiveness and richness of a note-book, but with much also of its fragmentariness. I have therefore been obliged to supplement my account of it by constant references to the other writings of Leibniz, and occasionally to take considerable liberty with the order of the treatment of topics. Upon the whole, this book will be found, I hope, to be a faithful reflex not only of Leibniz's thought, but also of his discussions in the "Nouveaux Essais."

In the main, the course of philosophic thought since the time of Leibniz has been such as to render almost self-evident his limitations, and to suggest needed corrections and amplifications. Indeed, it is much easier for those whose thoughts follow the turn that Kant has given modern thinking to appreciate the defects of Leibniz than to realize his greatness. I have endeavored, therefore, in the body of the work, to identify my thought with that of Leibniz as much as possible, to assume his standpoint and method, and, for the most part, to confine express criticism upon his limitations to the final chapter. In particular, I have attempted to bring out the relations of philosophy to the growing science of his times, to state the doctrine of pre-established harmony as he himself meant it, and to give something like consistency and coherency to his doctrine of material existence and of nature. This last task seemed especially to require doing. I have also endeavored to keep in mind, throughout, Leibniz's relations to Locke, and to show the "Nouveaux Essais" as typical of the distinction between characteristic British and German thought.

JOHN DEWEY.

May, 1888.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
The Man.
	PAGE
His Parents	1
His Early Education	2
His University Training at Leipsic	4
At Jena	8
At the University of Altdorf	10
His Removal to Frankfurt	10
His Mission to Paris	11
Discovery of the Calculus	12
Librarian at Hanover	13
His Activities	14
His Philosophic Writings	15
His Ecclesiastic and Academic Projects	17
His Later Years and Death	18
CHAPTER II.
Sources of his Philosophy.
Character of the Epoch into which Leibniz was born	20
The Thought of the Unity of the World	23
The two Agencies which formed Leibniz's Philosophy	24
The Cartesian Influences	26
Rationalistic Method	28
Mechanical Explanation of Nature	30
Application of Mathematics	32
Idea of Evolution	33
Interpretation of these Ideas	35
Idea of Activity or Entelechy	39
Idea of Rationality	40
Idea of Organism	42
CHAPTER III.
The Problem and its Solution.
Unity of Leibniz's Thought	43
Relation of Universal and Individual	44
Descartes' Treatment of this Question	46
Spinoza's Treatment of it	48
Leibniz's Solution	50
All Unity is Spiritual	53
And Active	54
Is a Representative Individual	56
Contrast of Monad and Atom	58
Pre-established Harmony reconciles Universal and Individual	59
Meaning of this Doctrine	62
CHAPTER IV.
Locke and Leibniz.—Innate Ideas.
Necessity of Preliminary Account of Leibniz's Philosophy	66
Locke's Empiricism	67
Leibniz's Comments upon Locke	69
The Controversies of Leibniz	72
The Essay on the Human Understanding	73
Locke's Denial of Innate Ideas	75
Depending upon
(1) His Mechanical Conception of Innate Ideas	77
Leibniz undermines this by substituting an Organic Conception	80
And upon
(2) His Mechanical Conception of Consciousness	84
Leibniz refutes this by his Theory of Unconscious Intelligence	85
CHAPTER V.
Sensation and Experience.
Importance of Doctrine regarding Sensation	87
The Two Elements of Locke's Notion of Sensation	89
Its Relation to the Object producing it: Primary and Secondary Qualities	91
Locke criticized as to his Account
(1) Of the Production of Sensation	92
(2) Of its Function in Knowledge	95
The Meaning of Physical Causation	97
Bearing of this Doctrine upon Relation of Soul and Body	98
Criticism of Locke's Dualism	98
Leibniz's Monism	101
Summary of Discussion	103
Leibniz on the Relation of Sensations to Objects occasioning them	105
Nature of Experience	106
Distinction of Empirical from Rational Knowledge	107
CHAPTER VI.
The Impulses and the Will.
The Doctrine of Will depends upon that of Intelligence	109
The Character of Impulse	111
Of Desire	112
Half-Pains and Pleasures	113
The Outcome of Desire	115
Nature of Moral Action	117
Of Freedom	118
(1) Freedom as Contingency	119
Limitation of this Principle	121
(2) Freedom as Spontaneity	123
This Principle is too Broad to be a Moral Principle	125
(3) True Freedom is Rational Action	125
Our Lack of Freedom is due to our Sensuous Nature	128
Innate Practical Principles	129
Moral Science is Demonstrative	130
CHAPTER VII.
Matter and its Relation to Spirit.
Locke's Account of Matter and Allied Ideas the Foundation of the Philosophy of Nature Characteristic of British Empiricism	132
Space and Matter wholly Distinct Ideas	134
Leibniz gives Matter a Metaphysical Basis	137
Ordinary Misunderstanding of Leibniz's Ideas of Matter	138
Matter is not composed of Monads	139
Matter is the Passive or Conditioned Side of Monads	140
Passivity equals "Confused Representations," i. e. Incomplete Development of Reason	144
Matter is logically Necessary from Leibniz's Principles	145
Bearing of Discussion upon Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony	146
Summary	147
CHAPTER VIII.
Material Phenomena and their Reality.
What is the Connection between Matter as Metaphysical and as Physical?	151
The Latter is the "Image" of the Former	151
Leibniz's Reaction from Cartesian Theory	152
His Objections are (1) Physical and (2) Logical	153
(1) Motion is Source of Physical Qualities of Bodies	155
Hence there are no Atoms	158
Secondary Qualities as well as Primary depend upon Motion	160
(2) What is the Subject to which the Quality of Extension belongs?	161
It is the Monad as Passive	162
Space and Time connect the Spiritual and the Sensible	164
Distinction between Space and Time, and Extension and Duration	166
Space and Time are Relations	167
Leibniz's Controversy with Clarke	168
Leibniz denies that Space and Time are Absolute	170
What is the Reality of Sensible Phenomena?	173
It consists
(1) In their Regularity	174
(2) In their Dependence upon Intelligence and Will	175
Leibniz and Berkeley	177
CHAPTER IX.
Some Fundamental Conceptions.
Locke's Account of Substance as Static	179
The Distinction between Reality and Phenomena	180
Leibniz's Conception of Substance as Dynamic	181
His Specific Criticisms upon Locke	182
The Categories of Identity and Difference Locke also explains in a Mechanical Way	183
Leibniz regards them as Internal and as Organic to each other	184
Locke gives a Quantitative Notion of Infinity	188
And hence makes our Idea of it purely Negative	189
Leibniz denies that the True Notion of Infinity is Quantitative	189
He also denies Locke's Account of the Origin of the Indefinite	192
In General, Locke has a Mechanical Idea, Leibniz a Spiritual, of these Categories	193
CHAPTER X.
The Nature and Extent of Knowledge.
Locke's Definition and Classification of Knowledge	196
Leibniz's Criticism	197
Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant regarding Knowledge of Objects	198
The Degrees of Knowledge,—Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive	199
Locke's Contradictory Theories regarding the Origin of Knowledge	202
Locke starts both with the Individual as given to Consciousness and with the Unrelated Sensation	204
Either Theory makes Relations or "Universals" Unreal	205
As to the Extent of Knowledge, that of Identity is Wide, but Trifling	205
That of Real Being includes God, Soul, and Matter, but only as to their Existence	206
And even this at the Expense of contradicting his Definition of Knowledge	206
Knowledge of Co-existence is either Trifling or Impossible	207
Leibniz rests upon Distinction of Contingent and Rational Truth	209
The Former may become the Latter, and is then Demonstrative	210
The Means of this Transformation are Mathematics and Classification	215
There are Two Principles,—One of Contradiction	217
The Other of Sufficient Reason	218
The Latter leads us to God as the Supreme Intelligence and the Final Condition of Contingent Fact	219
The Four Stages of Knowledge	222
CHAPTER XI.
The Theology of Leibniz.
Leibniz's Three Arguments for the Existence of God	224
The Value of the Ontological	225
The Cosmological	226
The Teleological	226
The Attributes of God	227
The Relation of God to the World, his Creating Activity	228
Creation involves Wisdom and Goodness as well as Power	229
The Relation of God to Intelligent Spirits: they form a Moral Community	230
Leibniz as the Founder of Modern German Ethical Systems	231
The End of Morality is Happiness as Self-realization	232
The Three Stages of Natural Right	234
The Basis of Both Leibniz's Ethics and Political Philosophy is Man's Relation to God	236
His sthetics have the Same Basis	237
Man's Spirit as Architectonic	238
CHAPTER XII.
Criticism and Conclusion.
Leibniz's Fundamental Contradiction is between his Method and his Subject Matter	240
The Use which Leibniz makes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason reveals this Contradiction	242
The Contradiction is between the Ideas of Formal and of Concrete Unity	243
From this Contradiction flow
(1) The Contradiction in the Notion of Individuality	246
Which becomes purely Negative	247
The Negative he interprets as merely Privative	249
(2) The Contradiction in his Conception of God has the Same Source	250
He really has Three Definitions of God	250
One results in Atomism, another in Pantheism	251
The Third in a Conception of the Organic Harmony of the Infinite and Finite	252
(3) The Contradiction between the Real and the Ideal in the Monads has the Same Source	253
(4) As have also the Contradictions in the Treatment of the Relations of Matter and Spirit	254
(5) And finally, his Original Contradiction leads to a Contradictory Treatment of Knowledge	257
Summary as to the Positive Value of Leibniz	259
The Influence of Leibniz's Philosophy	261
Especially upon Kant	262
Kant claims to be the True Apologist for Leibniz	263
(1) As to the Doctrine of Sufficient Reason and Contradiction	263
Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgment	266
(2) As to the Relation of Monads and Matter	268
Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Relation of the Sensuous and Supersensuous	268
(3) And finally, as to the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony	269
Which Kant transforms into Harmony between Understanding and Sense	269
And between the Categories of the Understanding and the Ideas of Reason	270
Conclusion	272