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difficulties being consider'd, which a man hath in the maintaining
of a State new gotten, some might marvaile how it came to pass,
that Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years; and
having hardly possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed
probable that all that State should have rebelled; nevertheless his
Successors kept the possession of it, nor found they other
difficulty in holding it, than what arose among themselves through
their own ambition. I answer, that all the Principalities whereof
we have memory left us, have been governed in two several manners;
either by a Prince, and all the rest Vassals, who as ministers by
his favor and allowance, do help to govern that Kingdom; or by a
Prince and by Barons, who not by their Princes favor, but by the
antiquity of blood hold that degree. And these kinds of Barons have
both states of their own, and Vassals who acknowledge them for
their Lords; and bare them a true natural affection. Those States
that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals, have their Prince
ruling over them with more authority; for in all his countrey,
there is none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they
yeeld obedience to any one else, it is but as to his minister and
officer, nor beare they him any particular good will. The examples
of these two different Governments now in our dayes, are, the Turk,
and the King of France. The Turks whole Monarchy is govern'd by one
Lord, and the rest are all his Vassals; and dividing his whole
Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governments, he sends several
thither, and those he chops and changes, as he pleases. But the
King {274} of France is seated in the midst of a
multitude of Lords, who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by
their subjects, and being belov'd by them, enjoy their
preheminencies; nor can the King take their States from them
without danger. He then that considers the one and the other of
these two States, shall find difficulty in the conquest of the
Turks State; but when once it is subdu'd, great facility to hold
it. The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks
Kingdom from him, are, because the Invader cannot be called in by
the Princes of that Kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of those
which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprize:
which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for they being all his
slaves, and oblig'd to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put
case they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they
not being able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we
have shewed: whereupon he that assails the Turk, must think to find
him united; and must rather relie upon his own forces, than in the
others disorders: but when once he is overcome and broken in the
field, so that he cannot repair his armies, there is nothing else
to be doubted than the Royal blood, which being once quite out,
there is none else left to be feard, none of the others having any
credit with the people. And as the conqueror before the victory
could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to fear them. The
contrary falls out in Kingdoms governed as is that of France: for
it is easie to be enterd by the gaining of any Baron in the
Kingdom; for there are alwaies some malecontents to be found, and
those that are glad of innovation. Those for the reasons alledg'd
are able to open thee a way into that State, and to further thy
victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it
exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have ayded
thee, as those thou hast supprest. Nor is it enough for thee to
root out the Princes race: for there remaine still those Lords who
quickly will be the ring-leaders of new changes; and in case thou
art not able to content these, nor extinguish them, thou losest
that State, whensoever the occasion is offerd. Now if thou
{275} shalt consider what sort of government
that of Darius was, thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominion,
and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him
utterly, and drive him out of the field; after which victory Darius
being dead, that State was left secure to Alexander, for the
reasons we treated of before: and his successors, had they
continued in amity, might have enjoy'd it at ease: nor ever arose
there in that Kingdome other tumults, than those they themselves
stir'd up. But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that
of France, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from
hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece
against the Romans, by reason of the many Principalities those
States had: whereof while the memory lasted, the Romans were
alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them; but the memory of them
being quite wip't out, by the power and continuance of the Empire,
at length they enjoy'd it securely; and they also were able
afterwards fighting one with another, each of one them to draw
after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their
authority had gain'd them credit therein: and that because the
blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent, they acknowledg'd no
other but the Romans. By the consideration then of these things, no
man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to keep
together the State of Asia; and that others have had such great
difficulties to maintain their conquest, as Pyrrhus, and many
others; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the
conquerour, but from the difference of the subject.
{276}
In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd,
which, before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own Laws.
hen those
States that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to
live under their own Laws, and in liberty, there are three wayes
for a man to hold them. The first is to demolish all their strong
places; the other, personally to goe and dwell there; the third, to
suffer them to live under their own Laws, drawing from them some
tribute, and creating therein an Oligarchy, that may continue it in
thy service: for that State being created by that Prince, knowes it
cannot consist without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he
can to maintain it; and with more facility is a City kept by meanes
of her own Citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than
by any other way of keeping. We have for example the Spartans and
the Romans; the Spartans held Athens and Thebes, creating there an
Oligarchy: yet they lost it. The Romans to be sure of Capua,
Carthage, and Numantia, dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them
not: they would have kept Greece as the Spartans had held them,
leaving them free, and letting them enjoy their own Laws; and it
prospered not with them: so that they were forc'd to deface many
Cities of that province to hold it. For in truth there is not a
surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever
becomes master of a City us'd to live free, and dismantells it not,
let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it; for it alwayes in time
of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge, and the ancient
orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours
afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can be
done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited {277} and
dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but
presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as Pisa did
after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines.
But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a
Prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated: on one part being
us'd to obey; on the other, not having their old Prince; they agree
not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in
liberty, in such manner that they are much slower to take armes;
and with more facility may a Prince gaine them, and secure himselfe
of them. But in Republiques there is more life in them, more
violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the
remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them, or suffer them
to rest; so that the safest way, is, either to ruine them, or dwell
among them.
Of new Principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes and
valour.
