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et no man
marvaile, if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities,
both touching a Prince, and touching a State, I shall alledge very
famous examples: for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes
beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation; and
being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd, nor their
vertues, whose patterne thou set'st before thee, attain'd unto; a
wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest
persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to
the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto, at least it may
yeeld some favour thereof, and doe as good Archers use, who
thinking the place they intend to hit, too farre distant, and
knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry, they lay
their ayme a great {278} deale higher than the mark; not for to
hit so high with their arrow, but to bee able with the help of so
high an aime to reach the place they shoot at. I say, that in
Principalities wholly new, where there is a new Prince, there is
more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them, as the vertue of
their Conquerour is greater or lesser. And because this successe,
to become a Prince of a private man, presupposes either vertue, or
fortune; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part
should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath lesse stood
upon fortune, hath maintain'd himselfe the better. Moreover it
somewhat facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrain'd,
because he hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell
there. But to come to these who by their own vertues, and not by
fortune, attain'd to be Princes; the excellentest of these are
Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like; and though of Moses
we are not to reason, he onely executing the things that were
commanded him by God; yet merits he well to be admir'd, were it
only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with God. But
considering Cyrus, and the others, who either got or founded
Kingdomes, we shall find them all admirable; and if there
particular actions and Lawes be throughly weigh'd, they will not
appeare much differing from those of Moyses, which he receiv'd from
so Sovraigne an instructer. And examining their lives and actions,
it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the
occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might
introduce what forme they then pleas'd; and without that occasion,
the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd; and without that
vertue, the occasion had been offer'd in vaine. It was then
necessary for Moses to find the people of Israel slaves in
Ægypt, and oppress'd by the Ægyptians, to the end that
they to get out of their thraldome, should bee willing to follow
him. It was fit that Romulus should not be kept in Albia, but
expos'd presently after his birth, that he might become King of
Rome, and founder of that City. There was need that Cyrus should
find the Persians discontented with the {279} Medes
government, and the Medes delicate and effeminate through their
long peace. Theseus could not make proof his vertue, had not he
found the Athenians dispers'd. These occasions therefore made these
men happy, and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken
notice of, whereby their countrey became enobled, and exceeding
fortunate. They, who by vertuous waies, like unto these, become
Princes, attain the Principality with difficulty, but hold it with
much ease; and the difficulties they find in gaining the
Principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are
forc'd to bring in, to lay the foundation of their State, and work
their own security. And it is to be consider'd, how there is not
any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor
more dangerous to mannage, than to be the chief in bringing in new
orders; for this Chief finds all those his enemies, that thrive
upon the old orders; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those
that would do well upon the new orders, which luke-warme temper
proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to
their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly
beleeve not a new thing, unless there be some certain proof given
them thereof. Whereupon it arises, that whensoever they that are
adversaries, take the occasion to assayle, they do it factiously;
and these others defend but cooly, so that their whole party
altogether runs a hazzard. Therefore it is necessary, being we
intend throughly to discourse this part, to examine if these
innovators stand of themselves, or if they depend upon others; that
is, if to bring their work to effect, it be necessary they should
intreat, or be able to constrain; in the first case they allwayes
succeed ill, and bring nothing to pass; but when they depend of
themselves, and are able to force, then seldom it is that they
hazzard. Hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd,
prevail'd; but those that were unarm'd, were too weak: for besides
what we have alledg'd, the nature of the people is changeable, and
easie to be perswaded to a matter; but it is hard also to settle
them in that perswasion. And therefore it behoves {280} a man to
be so provided, that when they beleeve no longer, he may be able to
compel them thereto by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus
would never have been able to cause their Laws to be obey'd, had
they been disarm'd; as in our times it befel Fryer Jerome
Savanarola, who perished in his new constitutions, when the
multitude began not to beleeve him; neither had he the means to
keep them firme, that had beleev'd; not to force beleefe in them
that had not beleev'd him. Wherefore such men as these, in their
proceedings find great difficulty, and all their dangers are in the
way, and these they must surmount by their vertue; but having once
master'd them, and beginning to be honored by all, when they have
rooted those out that envi'd their dignities, they remain powerful,
secure, honorable, and happy. To these choice examples, I will add
one of less remark; but it shall hold some proportion with them,
and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is
Hiero the Siracusan. He of a private man, became Prince of
Siracusa, nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion:
for the Siracusans being oppress'd, made choyce of him for their
Captain, whereupon he deserv'd to be made their Prince: and he was
of such vertue even in his private fortune, that he who writes of
him, sayes, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a Kingdom; this man
extinguish'd all the old soldiery, ordaind the new; left the old
allyances, entertained new; and as he had friendship, and soldiers
that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any
edifice; so that he indured much trouble in gaining, and suffered
but little in maintaining.
{281}
Of new Principalities, gotten by fortune, and other mens
forces.
hey who by
fortune only become Princes of private men, with small pains attain
to it, but have much ado to maintain themselves in it; and find no
difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with
wings: but all the difficulties arise there, after they are plac'd
in them. And of such sort are those who have an estate given them
for money, by the favor of some one that grants it them: as it
befell many in Greece, in the cities of Jonia, and Hellespont;
where divers Princes were made by Darius, as well for his own
safety as his glory; as also them that were made Emperors; who from
private men by corrupting the soldiers, attaind to the Empire.
These subsist meerly upon the will, and fortune of those that have
advanced them; which are two voluble and unsteady things; and they
neither know how, nor are able to continue in that dignity: they
know not how, because unless it be a man of great understanding and
vertue, it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private
life, can know how to command: neither are they able, because they
have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them.
Moreover those States that suddenly fall into a mans hands, as all
other things in nature that spring and grow quickly, cannot well
have taken root, nor have made their correspondencies so firm, but
that the first storm that takes them, ruines them; in case these,
who (as it is said) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be Princes,
are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare
themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their
bosoms, and can afterwards lay those foundations, which others have
cast before they were Princes. For the one and {282} the other
of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince, by Vertue, or by
Fortune, I will alledge you two examples which have been in the
dayes of our memory. These were Francis Sforza, and Cæsar
Borgia; Francis by just means and with a great deal of vertue, of a
private man got to be Duke of Millan; and that which with much
pains he had gaind, he kept with small ado. On the other side
Cæesar Borgia (commonly termed Duke Valentine) got his state
by his Fathers fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for
his own part no pains was spar'd, nor any thing omitted, which by a
discreet and valorus man ought to have been done, to fasten his
roots in those Estates, which others armes or fortune had bestowed
on him; for (as it was formerly said) he that lays not the
foundations first, yet might be able by means of his extraordinary
vertues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great
trouble of the architect, and danger of the edifice. If therefore
we consider all the Dukes progresses, we may perceive how great
foundations he had cast for his future power, which I judge a
matter not superfluous to run over; because I should not well know,
what better rules I might give to a new Prince, than the pattern of
his actions; and however the courses he took, availd him not, yet
was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and
extream malignity of fortune. Pope Alexander the sixt, desiring to
make the Duke his son a great man, had a great many difficulties,
present and future: first he saw no way there was whereby he might
be able to make him Lord of any State, that was not the Churches;
and if he turnd to take that from the Church, he knew that the Duke
of Milan, and the Venetians would never agree to it; for Faenza and
Riminum were under the Venetians protection. Moreover, he saw that
the armes of Italy, and those whereof in particular he might have
been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to fear
the Popes greatness; and therefore could not any wayes rely upon
them: being all in the Orsins and Colonies hands, and those of
their faction. It was necessary then, that those matters thus
appointed by them should be disturbed, and {283} the
States of Italy disordered, to be able safely to master part of
them, which he then found easie to do, seeing the Venetians upon
three considerations had us'd the means to bring the French men
back again into Italy: which he not only did not withstand, but
furthered, with a resolution of King Lewis his ancient marriage.
The King then past into Italy with the Venetians ayd, and
Alexanders consent; nor was he sooner arrived in Milan, than the
Pope had soldiers from him for the service of Romania, which was
quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the Kings forces.
The Duke then having made himself master of Romania, and beaten the
Colonies, desiring to hold it, and proceed forward, two things
hindered him: the one, his own soldiers, which he thought were not
true to him; the other, the French mens good wills; that is to say,
he feared that the Princes soldiers, whereof he had served himself,
would fail him, and not only hinder his conquest, but take from him
what he had gotten; and that the King also would serve him the same
turn. He had experience of the Orsini upon an occasion, when after
the taking of Faenza he assaulted Bolonia, to which assault he saw
them go very cold. And touching the King, he discovered his mind,
when having taken the Dutchy of Urbin, he invaded Tuscany; from
which action the King made him retire; whereupon the Duke resolved
to depend no more upon fortune, and other mens armes. And the first
thing he did, was, to weaken the Orsini, and Colonnies factions in
Rome: for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen, giving
them large allowances, and honoring them according to their
qualities with charges and governments; so that in a few months the
good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht, and
wholly bent to the Duke. After this, he waited an occasion to root
out the Orsini, having before dispersed those of the family of
Colonnia, which fell out well to his hand; and he us'd it better.
For the Orsini being too late aware, that the Dukes and the
Churches greatness was their destruction, held a Council together
in a dwelling house of theirs in the {284} country adjoyning to
Perusia. From thence grew the rebellion of Urbin, and the troubles
of Romania, and many other dangers befell the Duke, which he
overcame all with the help of the French: and having regained his
reputation, trusting neither France, nor any forrein forces, to the
end he might not be put to make trial of them again, he betook
himself to his sleghts; and he knew so well to disguise his
intention, that the Orsins, by the mediation of Paul Orsine, were
reconciled to him, to whom the Duke was no way wanting in all
manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security, giving
them rich garments, money, and horses, til their own simplicities
led them all to Sinigallia, into his hands. These heads being then
pluck'd off, and their partisans made his friends; the Duke had
laid very good foundations, to build his own greatness on, having
in his power all Romania with the Dutchy of Urbin, and gained the
hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some relish of
their well being. And because this part is worthy to be taken
notice of, and to be imitated by others, I will not let it escape.
The Duke, when he had taken Romania, finding it had been under the
hands of poor Lords who had rather pillag'd their subjects, than
chastis'd or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than
of peace and union, so that the whole countrey was fraught with
robberies, quarrels, and other sorts of insolencies; thought the
best way to reduce them to termes of pacification, and obedience to
a Princely power, was, to give them some good government: and
therefore he set over them one Remiro D'Orco, a cruel hasty man, to
whom he gave an absolute power. This man in a very short time
setled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation.
Afterwards the Duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so
well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected
a civil Judicature in the midst of the countrey, where one
excellent Judge did Preside, and thither every City sent their
Advocate: and because he knew the rigors past had bred some hatred
against him, to purge the minds of those people, and to gain them
wholly to himself, he purpos'd to {285} shew, that if there was any
cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the
harsh disposition of his Officers. Whereupon laying hold on him, at
this occasion, he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning
early in the market place at Cesena, where he was left upon a
gibbet, with a bloody sword by his side; the cruelty of which
spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people. But to
return from whence we have digressd: I say, that the Duke finding
himself very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present
dangers, because he was arm'd after his own manner, and had in some
good measure suppress'd those forces, which, because of their
vicinity, were able to annoy him, he wanted nothing else to go on
with his Conquest, but the consideration of France: for he knew,
that the King, who now, though late, was advis'd of his error,
would never suffer him: and hereupon he began to seek after new
allyances, and to waver with France, when the French came towards
Naples against the Spaniards, who then besieged Gagetta; and his
design was only to be out of their danger, which had been effected
for him, had Pope Alexander lived. And thus were his businesses
carried touching his present estate. As for the future, he had
reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be
his friend, and would endeavor to take that from him that Alexander
had bestowed on him; and he thought to provide for this foure
waies: First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had
dispoyled, whereby to take those occasions from the Pope. Secondly,
by gaining all the gentlemen of Rome, whereby he might be able with
those to keep the Pope in some awe. Thirdly, to make the Colledge
of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be.
Fourthly, by making of so large Conquests, before the Popes death,
as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of
his enemies. Three of these fowre at Pope Alexanders death he had
effected, and the fourth he had neare brought to a point. For of
those Lords he had stript, he put to death as many as he could come
at, and very few escap'd him: he gaind him the Roman Gentlemen: and
in the Colledge he had made a {286} great faction. And touching
his new Conquest, he had a designe to become Lord of Tuscany. And
he had possessed himself already of Perusia, and Pombin, and taken
protection of Pisa: and so soon as he should have cast off his
respect to France (which now he meant to hold no longer) being the
French were now driven out of the Kingdome of Naples by the
Spaniards, so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at
any termes; he was then to leap into Pisa. After this Lucca and
Siena were presently to fall to him, partly for envy to the
Florentines, and partly for fear. The Florentines had no way to
escape him: all which, had it succeeded with him, as without
question it had, the very same year that Alexander dy'd, he had
made himself master of so great forces, and such reputation, that
he would have been able to have stood upon his own bottom, without
any dependance of fortune, or resting upon others helps, but only
upon his own strength and valor. But Alexander dy'd five years
after that he had begun to draw forth his sword: and left him
setled only in the State of Romania, with all his other designes in
the ayre, sick unto death, between two very strong armies of his
enemies; and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage;
and he understood so well, how men are to be gaind, and how to be
lost, and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time,
that, had he not had those armies upon his back, or had been in
health, he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all
opposition; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good, it
appeard in that Romania held for him above a moneth, and he
remained secure in Rome, though even at deaths doore: and however
the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came into Rome; yet found they
none would take their parts against him. And this he was able to
have effected, that if he could not have made him Pope whom be
would, he could have hindred him that he would not should be Pope.
But had he been in health when Alexander dy'd, every thing had gone
easily with him; and he told me on that day that Julius the second
was created Pope, that he had fore-thought on all that which could
happen, in case his {287} father chanc'd to dye, and for every
thing provided its remedy, this onely excepted, that he foresaw not
that he should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also.
Having then collected all the Dukes actions, me thinks I could not
well blame him, but rather (as I have here done) set him as a
pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes
have been exalted to an Empire. For he being of great courage, and
having lofty designes, could not carry himself otherwise; and the
only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of Alexanders life,
and his own sickness. Whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his
entrance into a new Principality, to secure himself of his enemies,
and gain him friends, to overcome either by force or by cunning, to
make himself beloved, or feared of his people, be followed and
reverenced by his soldiers, to root out those that can, or owe thee
any hurt, to change the ancient orders with new wayes, to be
severe, and yet acceptable, magnanimous, and liberall; to
extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery, and create new; to maintain to
himself the armities of Kings and Princes, so that they shall
either with favor benefit thee, or be wary how to offend thee;
cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this
man. He deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of
Julius the second, wherein an evil choice was made for him: for, as
it is said, not being able to make a Pope to his mind, he could
have withheld any one from being Pope; and should never have
consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the
Papacy, whom he had ever done harme to; or who having attaind the
Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily
do hurt either for fear, or hatred. Those whom he had offended,
were among others, he who had the title of St. Peter ad Vincula,
Colonna, St. George, and Ascanius; all the others that were in
possibility of the Popedome, were such as might have feard him
rather, except the Cardinal of Roan, and the Spaniards; these by
reason of their allyance and obligation with him, the other because
of the power they had, having the Kingdome of France on their
party; wherefore the Duke above {288} all things should have
created a Spanyard Pope, and in case he could not have done that,
he should have agreed that Roan should have been, and not St. Peter
ad Vincula. And whoever beleeves, that with great personages new
benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceiv'd.
The Duke therefore in this election, was the cause of his own ruine
at last.
