Page 53 of 68
CHAP. 15. Of those things in respect
whereof men, and especially Princes are prais'd or disprais'd
{261}
CHAP. 16. Of Liberality and
Miserableness
CHAP. 17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and
whether it is better to be belov'd or feared
CHAP. 18. In what manner Princes ought
to keep their word
CHAP. 19. That Princes should take a
care not to incur contempt or hatred
CHAP. 20. Whether the Citadels and many
other things, which Princes make use of, are profitable or
dammageable
CHAP. 21. How a Prince ought to behave
himself to gain reputation
CHAP. 22. Touching Princes
Secretaries
CHAP. 23. That Flatterers are to be
avoyded
CHAP. 24. Wherefore the Princes of
Italy have lost their States
{262}
CHAP. 25. How great power Fortune hath
in humane affairs, and what means there is to resist it
CHAP. 26. An exhortation to free Italy
from the Barbarions
{263}
THE PRINCE
Written by
NICHOLAS MACHIAVELLI, Secretary and Citizen of Florence.
How many sorts of Principalities there are, and how many wayes
they are attained to.
ll States,
all Dominions that have had, or now have rule over men, have been
and are, either Republiques or Principalities. Principalities are
either hereditary, whereof they of the blood of the Lord thereof
have long time been Princes; or else they are new; and those that
are new, are either all new, as was the Dutchy of Millan to Francis
Sforce; or are as members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the
Prince that gains it; as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of
Spain. These Dominions so gotten, are accustomed either to live
under a Prince, or to enjoy their liberty; and are made conquest
of, either with others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or
by valor.
{264}
Of Hereditary Principalities.
will not
here discourse of Republiques, because I have other where treated
of them at large: I will apply my self only to a Principality, and
proceed, while I weave this web, by arguing thereupon, how these
Principallities can be governed and maintained. I say then that in
States of inheritance, and accustomed to the blood of their
Princes, there are far fewer difficulties to keep them, than in the
new: for it suffices only not to transgress the course his
Ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with those accidents
that can happen; that if such a Prince be but of ordinary industry,
he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his State, unless
by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof;
and when he had lost it, upon the least sinister chance that
befalls the usurper, he recovers it again. We have in Italy the
Duke of Ferrara for example hereof, who was of ability to resist
the Venetians, in the year 84, and to withstand Pope Julius in the
tenth for no other reason, than because he had of old continued in
that rule; for the natural Prince hath fewer occasions, and less
heed to give offence, whereupon of necessity he must be more
beloved; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring
him into hatred, it is agreeable to reason, that naturally he
should be well beloved by his own subjects: and in the antiquity
and continuation of the Dominion, the remembrances and occasions of
innovations are quite extinguished: for evermore one change leaves
a kind of breach or dent, to fasten the building of another.
{265}
Of mixt Principalities.
ut the
difficulties consist in the new Principality; and first, if it be
not all new, but as a member, so that it may be termed altogether
as mixt; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from
a natural difficulty, which we commonly finde in all new
Principalities; for men do willingly change their Lord, beleeving
to better their condition; and this beliefe causes them to take
armes against him that rules over them, whereby they deceive
themselves, because they find after by experience, they have made
it worse: which depends upon another natural and ordinary
necessity, forcing him alwaies to offend those, whose Prince he
newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon
them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest draws along
with it; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies,
whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that Principality, and
afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in
it, for not being able to satisfie them according to their
expectations, nor put in practice strong remedies against them,
being obliged to them. For however one be very well provided with
strong armies, yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the
inhabitants in the Countrey, to enter thereinto. For these reasons,
Lewis the twelfth, King of France, suddenly took Milan, and as soon
lost it; and the first time Lodwick his own forces served well
enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those people that had
opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of their opinion,
and of that future good which they had promised themselves, could
not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them. True it is, that
Countreys that have rebelled again the second time, being
recovered, are harder lost; for their Lord, taking occasion from
their rebellion, is less respective of {266} persons,
but cares only to secure himself, by punishing the delinquents, to
clear all suspicions, and to provide for himself where he thinks he
is weakest: so that if to make France lose Milan the first time, it
was enough for Duke Lodwick to make some small stir only upon the
confines; yet afterwards, before they could make him lose it the
second time, they had need of the whole world together against him,
and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of Italy;
which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though both the
first and second time it was taken from him. The generall causes of
the first we have treated of; it remains now that we see those of
the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else
can have that should chance to be in those termes he was, whereby
he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than
the King of France did. I say therefore, that these States which by
Conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conqueror, are
either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise;
and when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when
they are not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is
enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them:
For in other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and
there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men
ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seen that Burgundy did,
Britany, Gascony, and Normandy, which so long time continued with
France: for however there be some difference of language between
them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever
makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two
regards; the first, that the race of their former Prince be quite
extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their
lawes nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one
entire body with their ancient Principality. But when any States
are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language, manners, and
orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good
fortune, and great industry to maintain them; and it would be one
of the best {267} and livelyest remedies, for the
Conqueror to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the
possession hereof more secure and durable; as the Turk hath done in
Greece, who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold
that State, had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it
had never been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there,
he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith
can remedy them; whereas being not there present, they are heard of
when they are grown to some height, and then is there no help for
them. Moreover, the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou
sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse
to the Prince near at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love
him, if they mean to be good; and intending to do otherwise, to
fear him: and forrein Princes will be well aware how they invade
that State; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very
hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is also a better, is to send
Colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keys
of that State; for it is necessary either to do this, or to
maintain there many horse and foot. In these colonies the Prince
makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very
small rate, he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence
only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow
them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that
State; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore,
can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence
given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on
the other side, they are wary not to erre, for fear it befalls not
them, as it did those that were dispoild. I conclude then, that
those colonies that are not chargeable, are the more trusty, give
the less offence; and they that are offended, being but poor and
scattered, can do but little harme, as I have said; for it is to be
noted, that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall, or
else be quite crusht; for they revenge themselves of small
dammages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when wrong
is done {268} to any man, it ought so to be done, that
it need fear no return of revenge again. But in lieu of Colonies,
by maintaining soldiers there, the expence is great; for the whole
revenues of that State are to be spent in the keeping of it; so the
conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it, and endammages
him rather; for it hurts that whole State to remove the army from
place to place, of which annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so
becomes enemie to thee; as they are enemies, I wis, who are
outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to
do thee mischief. Every way then is this guard unprofitable.
Besides, he that is in a different Province, (as it is said) should
make himself Head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors, and
devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and
take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as
mighty as himself; for it will alwaies come to pass, that they
shall be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon
ambition, or fear; as the Etolians brought the Romans into Greece;
and they were brought into every countrey they came, by the
Natives; and the course of the matter is, that so soon as a
powerfull Stranger enters a countrey, all those that are the less
powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by an envy they beare him
that is more mighty than they; so that for these of the weaker
sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for presently all
of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath
gotten: He hath only to beware that these increase not their
strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by
his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are
mighty, and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Countrey. And
he that playes not well this part, shall quickly lose what he hath
gotten; and while he holds it, shall find therein a great many
troubles and vexations. The Romans in the Provinces they seiz'd on,
observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the
weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the
forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerfull
forreiner to gain too much {269} reputation there. And I will content
my self only with the countrey of Greece for example hereof. The
Achayans and Etolians were entertained by them, the Macedons
kingdome was brought low, Antiochus was driven thence, nor ever did
the Achayans or Etolians deserts prevail so far for them, that they
would ever promise to enlarge their State, nor the perswasions of
Philip induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him
lower; nor yet could Antiochus his power make them ever consent
that he should hold any State in that countrey: for the Romans did
in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to do, who
are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefs, but also to
the future, and to provide for those with all industry; for by
taking order for those when they are afarre off, it is easie to
prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee, the
remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable: and
it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hectick feaver, that
in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known; but in the
course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured,
it becomes easie to know, but hard to cure. Even so falls it out in
matters of State; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only
to a wise man to do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly
helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are suffered
to increase, so that every one sees them, there is then no cure for
them: therefore the Romans, seeing these inconvenients afar off,
alwaies prevented them, and never sufferd them to follow; for to
escape a war, because they knew that a war is not undertaken, but
deferred for anothers advantage; therefore would they rather make a
war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, to the end it should not
afterwards be made with them in Italy, though for that time they
were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they thought
not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is
ordinarily in the mouthes of the Sages of our dayes, to enjoy
the benefits of the present time; but that rather, to take the
benefit of their valor and wisdome; for time drives forward
everything, and may bring {270} with it as well good as evil, and
evil as good. But let us return to France, and examine if any of
the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of
Lewis, and not of Charles, as of whom by reason of the long
possession he held in Italy we better knew the wayes he went: and
you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been
done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and
conditions. King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians
ambition, who would have gotten for their shares half the State of
Lombardy: I will not blame his comming, or the course he took,
because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in Italy; but having
not any friends in the country, all gates being barred against him,
by reason of King Charles his carriage there, he was constrained to
joyn friendship with those he could; and this consideration well
taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his
courses he had not committed any error. The King then having
conquered Lombardy, recovered presently all that reputation that
Charles had lost him; Genua yeelded to him, the Florentines became
friends with him; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the
Bentivolti, the Lady of Furli, the Lord of Faenza, Pesaro Rimino,
Camerino, and Piombino, the Lucheses, Pisans and Sienses, every one
came and offered him friendship: then might the Venetians consider
the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into
their hands two Townes in Lombardy, made the King Lord of two
thirds in Italy. Let any man now consider with how small difficulty
could the King have maintained his reputation in Italy, if he had
followed these aforenamed rules, and secured and defended those his
friends, who because their number was great, and they weak and
fearful, some of the Church, and others of the Venetians were
alwaies forced to hold with him, and by their means he might easily
have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest:
but he was no sooner got into Milan, than he took a quite wrong
course, by giving ayd to Pope Alexander, to seize upon Romania, and
perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself, ruining
his own {271} friends, and those had cast themselves
into his bosom, making the Church puissant, by adding to their
Spiritual power, they gaind their authority, and so much temporal
estate. And having once got out of the way, he was constrained to
go on forward; insomuch as to stop Alexanders ambition, and that he
should not become Lord of all Tuscany, of force he was to come into
Italy: and this sufficed him not, to have made the Church mighty,
and taken away his own friends; but for the desire he had to get
the Kingdome of Naples, he divided it with the King of Spain: and
where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy, he brought in a
competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that
country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have
otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left
in that Kingdome some Vice-King of his own, he took him from
thence, to place another there, that might afterward chace him
thence. It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire
to be of the getting hand: and alwaies when men undertake it, if
they can effect it, they shall be prais'd for it, or at least not
blam'd: but when they are not able, and yet will undertake it, here
lies the blame, here is the error committed. If France then was
able with her own power to assail the Kingdome of Naples, she might
well have done it; but not being able, she should not have divided
it: and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians,
deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in Italy; yet this
merits blame, for not being excused by that necessity. Lewis then
committed these five faults; extinguisht the feebler ones,
augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy,
brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner, came not thither
himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which
faults while he liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all
could not have gone so ill, had he not committed the sixt, to take
from the Venetians their State; for if he had not enlarg'd the
Churches territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy, it had
bin necessary to take them lower; but having first taken those
other courses, he should never have {272} given way to their
destruction; for while they had been strong, they would alwaies
have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of
Lombardy. For the Venetians would never have given their consents
thereto, unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves;
and the others would never have taken it from France, to give it
them: and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them
both together. And if any one should say, that King Lewis yeelded
Romania to Alexander, and the Kingdome of Naples to Spain, to avoid
a war; I answer with the reasons above alledged, that one should
never suffer any disorder to follow, for avoiding of a war; for
that war is not sav'd, but put off to thy disadvantage. And if any
others argue, that the King had given his word to the Pope, to do
that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage, and for
giving the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan; I answer with that which
hereafter I shall say touching Princes words, how they ought to be
kept. King Lewis then lost Lombardy, for not having observ'd some
of those termes which others us'd, who have possessed themselves of
countries, and desir'd to keep them. Nor is this any strange thing,
but very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose I spake at
Nantes with that French Cardinal, when Valentine (for so ordinarily
was Cæsar Borgia Pope Alexanders son call'd) made himself
master of Romania; for when the Cardinal said to me, that the
Italians understood not the feats of war; I answered, the Frenchmen
understood not matters of State: for had they been well vers'd
therein, they would never have suffer'd the Church to have grown to
that greatness. And by experience we have seen it, that the power
hereof in Italy, and that of Spain also, was caused by France, and
their own ruine proceeded from themselves. From whence a general
rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, That he
that gives the means to another to become powerful, ruines
himself; for that power is caus'd by him either with his
industry, or with his force; and as well the one as the other of
these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant.
{273}
Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexander, rebelled not
against Alexanders Successors after his death.
