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ut comming
to the other part, when a principall Citizen, not by villany, or
any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his
fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey: which we may
terme a Civill Principality; nor to attaine hereunto is Vertue
wholly or Fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning:
I say, this Principality is climb'd up to, either by the peoples
help, or the great mens. For, in every City we finde these two
humours differ; and they {294} spring from this, that the people
desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the
great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people: and
from these two several appetites, arise in the City one of these
three effects, either a Principality, or Liberty, or Tumultuary
licentiousnesse. The Principality is caused either by the people,
or the great ones, according as the one or other of these factions
have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves not
able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to
one among them, and make him Prince, whereby they may under his
shadow vent their spleenes. The people also, not being able to
support the great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation
to one man, create him their Prince, to be protected by his
authority. He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of
the great ones, subsists with more difficulty, than he that
attaines to it by the peoples favour; for he being made Prince,
hath many about him, who account themselves his equalls, and
therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. But he
that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor, finds himselfe
alone in his throne, and hath none or very few neare him that are
not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon
easie termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others,
where as a small matter contents the people: for the end which the
people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the
great men, these desiring to oppresse, they only not to be
oppressed. To this may be added also, that the Prince which is the
peoples enemy, can never well secure himselfe of them, because of
their multitude; well may hee bee sure of the Nobles, they being
but a few. The worst that a Prince can look for of the people
become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the great
ones once grow his enemies, he is not only to feare their
abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also:
for there being in them more forecast and craft, they alwayes take
time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit
with him who they hope shall get the mastery. The Prince
{295} likewise is necessitated alwayes to live
with the same people, but can doe well enough without the same
great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them again
every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he
pleases: and to cleare this part, I say, that great men ought to be
considerd two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy
proceedings so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in
thine, in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought
to be well honourd and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to
thy fortune, are to be considerd also two wayes; either they doe it
for lack of courage, and naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst
thou serve thy selfe of them, and of them especially that are men
of good advice; for if thy affaires prosper, thou dost thy selfe
honour thereby; if crost, thou needst not feare them: but when they
oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of
ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee:
and of these the Prince ought to beware, and account of them as his
discoverd enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a
hand too to ruine thee. Therefore ought hee that comes to be Prince
by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may easily
doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that
becomes Prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the
people, ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he
may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection: And
because men when they find good, where they look for evill, are
thereby more endered to their benefactour, therefore growes the
people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours
he had attaind his dignity. And the Prince is able to gaine them to
his side by many wayes, which because they vary according to the
subject, no certaine rule can be given thereupon; wherefore we
shall let them passe I will only conclude, that it is necessary for
a Prince to have the people his friend; otherwise in his
adversities he hath no helpe. Nabis Prince of the Spartans
supported the siege of all Greece, and an exceeding victorious army
of the Romans, {296} and against those defended his native
countrey and State, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger
came upon him, he secur'd himself of a fewer; whereas if the people
had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. And let no man
think to overthrow this my opinion with that common proverb, that
He who relyes upon the people, layes his foundation in the dirt;
for that is true where a private Citizen grounds upon them, making
his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemyes
or the Magistrates oppresse him: In this case he should find
himself often deceiv'd, as it befell the Gracchyes in Rome, and in
Florence George Scali: but he being a Prince that grounds
thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his
wits about him in his adversityes, and wants not other
preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with
his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall
find he hath layd good foundations. These Principalityes are wont
to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from
the civil order to the absolute: for these Princes either command
of themselves, or by the Magistrate; in this last case their State
is more weak and dangerous, because they stand wholly at the will
and pleasure of these Citizens, who then are set over the
Magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility
to take their State from them either by rising up against them, or
by not obeying them; and then the Prince is not at hand in those
dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the Citizens
and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the
Magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in
doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he
may trust; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees
in peaceable times, when the Citizens have need of the State; for
then every one runs, and every one promises, and every one will
venture his life for him, where there is no danger neare; but in
times of hazzard, when the State hath need of Citizens, there are
but few of them then, and so much the more is this experience
dangerous, in that {297} it can be but once made. Therefore a
prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizens alwayes
and in any case and quality of time may have need of his
government, and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to
him.
In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be
measured.
t is
requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to have
another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such
dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of
himself, or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend
him. And to cleer this point the better, I judge them able to stand
of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men,
or quantity of money, to bring into the field a compleat armie, and
joyn battel with whoever comes to assail them: and so I think those
alwaies to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear
in the field against the enemy, but are forc'd to retire within
their walls and guard them. Touching the first case, we have
treated already, and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall
require. In the second case, we cannot say other, save only to
encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital
city, and of the countrey about, not to hold much account; and
whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other
matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his
subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall
never be assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake
not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through;
nor can much facility be there found, where one assails him, who
hath his town strong and wel guarded, and is not {298} hated of
his people. The cities of Germany are very free; they have but very
little of the countrey about them belonging to them; and they obey
the Emperor, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither
of him nor any other Potentate about them: for they are in such a
manner fortified, that every one thinks the siege of any of them
would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches, and
rampires, and good store of Artillery, and alwaies have their
publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a
yeer: besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without
any loss to the publick, they have alwaies in common whereby they
are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades
that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry
whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves: they hold up
also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many
orders to maintain them. A Prince then that is master of a good
strong city, and causeth not himself to be hated, cannot be
assaulted; and in case he were, he that should assail him, would be
fain to quit him with shame: for the affairs of the world are so
various, that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt
before a town for the space of a whole yeer: and if any should
reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case
they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the
tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget
their Prince: I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious, will
easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope,
that the mischief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them
with the cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly
securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the
enemy. Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and
waste their countrey, upon his arrival, and at those times while
mens minds are yet warme, and resolute in their defence: and
therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt: for after some few
dayes, that their courages grow coole, the dammages are all done,
and mischiefs received, and there is no help for {299} it, and
then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince,
thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his
defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and mens nature
is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do,
as for those they receive; whereupon if all be well weigh'd, a wise
Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him
his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege,
when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition.
Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities.
